The Dynamism of Daily Justice: A Person-Environment Fit Perspective on the Situated Value of Justice

Anna C. Lennard, Fadel K. Matta, Szu-Han (Joanna) Lin, Joel Koopman, Russell E. Johnson
The Dynamism of Daily Justice: A Person-Environment Fit Perspective on the Situated Value of Justice

Anna C. Lennard, Fadel K. Matta, Szu-Han (Joanna) Lin, Joel Koopman, Russell E. Johnson

Abstract. Despite the generally positive consequences associated with justice, recent research suggests that supervisors cannot always enact justice, and responses to justice may not be universally positive. Thus, justice is likely to vary in both how much it is received and the employee reactions it engenders. In order to understand the range of justice responses, we develop a dynamic theory of justice by using person-environment fit to take both the value that an individual places in justice and the justice they received into account. Using this framework, we clarify the consequences of congruence versus incongruence in daily justice received and valued, which have implications for treatment discrepancies and subsequent work behavior. We also identify the differences between excess and deficient justice on cognitive and affective responses to justice. Our findings reveal that employees’ experience of justice is more complicated than simply whether the justice they received was high or low on a particular day. Using experience sampling and polynomial regression methods, we observe that not all instances in which employees receive high levels of justice are equivalent. In fact, we find that, depending on justice valued, receiving high levels of justice can be just as detrimental as receiving low levels. Additionally, we find that although both forms of justice misfit (excess and deficiency) cause-negative work outcomes, they affect these outcomes through differential responses to justice — with excess causing increased rumination and deficiency causing decreased positive affect. We conclude by discussing the implications of these findings for extant justice theory and for supervisor-employee work interactions.

Funding: This work was supported by Michigan State University.

Keywords: justice • person-environment fit • polynomial regression

For five decades, the organizational justice literature has consistently shown that employees’ justice perceptions play a key role at work (Colquitt et al. 2005, Colquitt et al. 2013). Indeed, the sheer size and scope of this literature are due to the fact that justice affects a wide variety of employee work-related consequences such as task proficiency, citizenship behavior, counterproductive behavior, job satisfaction, and organizational commitment (Cohen-Charash and Spector 2001, Colquitt et al. 2001). Over time, the justice literature has consistently demonstrated the importance of employees’ justice perceptions, and the accumulation of findings such as those noted above has instilled two assumptions that are implicit within much justice research; (a) supervisors should consistently enact high levels of justice with employees, and (b) employees perceive justice as important and something of value.

Regarding the first assumption, scholars routinely advocate for supervisors to enact high levels of justice as much as possible (see, e.g., Cropanzano et al. 2007). Yet in practice, this is difficult to achieve (Brocker 2006), because supervisors face trade-offs in how they invest their time and resources (Graen and Scandura 1987, Graen and Uhl-Bien 1995, Koopman et al. 2015). For example, adhering to justice rules is both time-consuming (van den Bos and Lind 2002) and resource-depleting (Johnson et al. 2014), as supervisors have limited self-control resources (which can be consumed by justice enactment), tasks to accomplish, and other employees to interact with. Moreover, when managers are constrained by high workloads, research suggests that justice is often the casualty, because supervisors often prioritize the technical aspects of their jobs at the expense of adhering to justice rules (Sherf et al. 2019). Consequently, supervisors do not (and likely cannot) always adhere to justice rules on a day-to-day basis (Scott et al. 2014, Matta et al. 2017).

Regarding the second assumption, most scholarly work treats justice as something that employees value in a consistent and unchanging way. For example, a recent review of the work motivation literature concluded that employees have a universal desire for...
justice (Kanfer et al. 2017). Along similar lines, Cropanzano et al. (2011, p. 220) stated that “justice might be seen as the normal state that people do not notice until something goes wrong, just as a fish notices that it needs water only when it is taken out of the sea,” and Tolman (2006, p. 18) contended that “justice is fundamental to our being human.” Indeed, philosophers have emphasized the importance of justice since antiquity (see, e.g., Plato), and meta-analyses have confirmed the positive consequences of justice (see, e.g., Colquitt et al. 2013). Thus, we do not argue with the notion that justice is, in general, important and valuable to employees. However, this is not to say that employees value justice to the same extent in all instances at work.

It is well known that generalizing processes across levels of analysis is fraught and problematic (Klein and Kozlowski 2000). To that end, we distinguish between justice enactment as something employees value in general and justice enactment as something that employees value at particular times in daily life, what we will refer to as the value employees place on the situated enactment of justice criteria in daily life. This daily situated value represents an employee’s context- and time-dependent assessment of the importance, worth, or usefulness of experiencing the criteria associated with justice enactment at a given moment (e.g., on a specific day). Like other situated cognitions, one’s situated justice value “flexibly reflects a perceiver’s current social motives and relationships with others in the situation, rather than representing abstract and stable schemas” (Smith and Semin 2007, p. 133). Consistent with this view of justice enactment values as a situated cognition, Wiesendfeld et al. (2007, p. 1235) posited that “there are theoretical and empirical reasons to question whether the preference for … fair treatment is universal”—that is to say, at all times, in all cases, for all individuals. These authors found that some benefits of justice were negated for employees with low self-esteem because the just treatment did not align with the employees’ unfavorable view of themselves. Similarly, Matta et al. (2017) found that employees may in fact prefer lower levels of justice to higher levels so long as those lower levels are enacted consistently. More generally, evidence for the need to contextualize the value employees place on justice enactment comes from conceptual and empirical work indicating that justice-based perceptions and evaluations are influenced by the goals and knowledge that are currently activated in working memory (Lord et al. 1999, Sikutka 2003, Johnson et al. 2006a).

To illustrate, consider an employee who places a low value on justice today. Perhaps the employee does not value the outcome being distributed, does not want to interact with his or her supervisor, or is simply focused on his or her tasks. Despite the low value, the justice literature would still advocate for the employee’s supervisor to enact a high level of justice (despite that supervisor’s limited resources; see Lind and van den Bos 2002), because otherwise the employee’s job performance might suffer, or the employee may engage in counterproductive acts (see, e.g., Colquitt et al. 2013). The advice is much more nuanced, however, when this situation is viewed from the lens of P-E fit theory, which would not encourage supervisors wasting resources in this way. Instead, the supervisor should focus his or her efforts on an employee who places high value on justice enactment that day.

Therefore, decades of research on justice have revealed that employees may not always experience high levels of justice enactment on a daily basis. However, some employees may not always place high value on that justice enactment either. Stated in P-E fit terms, we expect variance in both the supply and value of justice enactment within an employee across days. Given the dynamic nature of the value of resources and their supplies within the workplace (Jansen and Shipp 2013, Gabriel et al. 2014), our goal is to develop and empirically test new justice theory that captures this within-person dynamism and increases our understanding of both the benefits and detriments of justice in the workplace as well as the mechanisms that drive them. Therefore, the theory we develop stands in stark contrast to the predominant “more is better” view of justice in the extant literature or even more recent views that “consistent is better” (Matta et al. 2017).

To generate novel predictions about the interplay between the level of justice an employee receives on a given day and the situated value that employee places on justice that day, we draw from P-E fit theory. This theory articulates that discrepancies between received and valued states trigger sensemaking processes aimed at identifying the cause(s) of discrepancies and taking corrective action (Edwards 1992, Johnson et al. 2006a, Johnson and Allen 2013). This theoretical perspective reveals that employees may contextualize the level of justice they receive by considering whether justice enactment was valued at that time. We examine these ideas broadly in Study 1. However, the P-E fit literature also argues that discrepancy can manifest as cases of either excess (more of a resource than one valued receiving) or deficiency (less of a resource than one valued receiving), and we believe that these two cases (i.e., excess and deficiency) trigger different justice-relevant responses, which we tease apart in Study 2. Specifically, we argue that cases of excess result in more cognitive and reflective processes that center on rumination about the confusing nature of (and possible responses to) excess justice enactment.
that contribute to social processing) that are adaptive in nature and therefore change, depending on the context (Smith and Semin 2007). For example, research has shown that individuals’ situated cognitions can change, depending on their motives, emotional states, and social environment (Bodenhausen et al. 1995, DeSteno et al. 2004). Building upon a tradition of P-E fit research on the congruence versus incongruence of what an employee sees as valuable and important and the extent to which the environment supplies matching levels of resources, we propose that understanding situated justice enactment is key to understanding the subsequent regulation of affect, cognition, and behavior (Edwards 1992, Kristof 1996, Johnson et al. 2013). Within this literature, there are three possible relationships between what the environment supplies and what the employee saw as important: excess, deficiency, and fit.

Excess occurs when available supplies exceed what the individual saw as necessary, resulting in waste. In our case, justice is not a resource that can be stored for later use (Edwards and Van Harrison 1993, Lambert et al. 2012). Because enacting justice may consume supervisors’ time (van den Bos and Lind 2002) and self-regulatory resources (Johnson et al. 2014), receiving justice when it is not valued could diminish the likelihood that an employee will receive it when it is valued (Matta et al. 2017). Indeed, supervisors are often unable to prioritize and engage in justice enactment (Sherf et al. 2019). Therefore, enacting justice when the employee’s situated value for that enactment is low effectively squanders a resource that may have had greater impact if supplied at a different time. Deficiency occurs when the available supply of a resource is insufficient to match the level seen as necessary. For justice enactment, perhaps an employee wants a specific piece of information or craves reassurance following a decision that was unfavorable. Deficiency is typically the worst situation, leading to the most negative reactions (Edwards et al. 1998). Finally, fit occurs when environmental supplies are equivalent to a current situated value, resulting in little to no excess or deficiency. Reactions to fit are generally more positive than reactions to excess or deficiency.

Consistent with P-E fit research, and drawing from the concepts of deficiency, excess, and fit described above, we consider three ways in which congruence versus incongruence can be examined (for exemplars of this approach, see Lambert et al. 2012, Matta et al. 2015, and Tepper et al. 2018). For expository purposes, and also following in the tradition of P-E fit research, we hold constant the level of justice either received or valued when discussing the psychological processes associated with changes in the other. Specifically, we first consider the effects on treatment discrepancy as we move from deficiency (low justice received yet
high justice enactment valued) through fit (congruence in justice received and valued) to excess (high justice received but low justice enactment valued). We then examine the downstream behavioral consequences (i.e., task proficiency, helping, and retaliation) of congruence versus incongruence in justice received and employees’ value of justice enactment. See Figure 1 for an overview of our model.

**Daily Effects of Congruence vs. Incongruence**

Upon experiencing a justice-related event on a given day, P-E fit theory specifically (Edwards and Van Harrison 1993) and self-regulation theory more broadly (Johnson et al. 2006a, Johnson et al. 2013) posit that employees will consider the situated value they place on justice enactment and assess the extent to which the level supplied by the environment aligns with or is discrepant from those time- and context-dependent values. We expect that situations of congruence between justice received and valued will result in lower levels of perceived treatment discrepancy than situations of incongruence.

Treatment discrepancy represents the degree to which the employee wishes that they were treated differently and is therefore centered on establishing whether a different result would, could, and should have occurred under different circumstances (Folger and Cropanzano 1998, 2001). When an actual treatment state is discrepant from a valued state (particularly when that discrepancy reflects a state that is more detrimental, relative to what was valued), this serves as an interruption that motivates individuals to make sense of the resultant discrepancy (Johnson et al. 2006b). Therefore, if the level of justice enactment is seen as deficient, this will likely elicit greater treatment discrepancy, as the employees’ situated value for that enactment reflects a need that remains unfulfilled (Edwards et al. 1998).

If, in contrast, the employee’s situated value for justice enactment was low (i.e., moving from a situation of deficiency toward one of fit), then despite the actual level of justice enactment being low, the employee is ultimately closer to having received what they wanted. We do not mean that receiving lower levels of justice is in some way an ideal state of affairs but rather that the consequences of lower justice enactment must be interpreted in context. In this situation, the employee placed lower value on justice enactment on that day; perhaps the employee is working on a time-sensitive task and does not want to be disturbed by a supervisor providing information about a recent decision. Whatever the situation-dependent reason, in such an instance, the employee is not likely to perceive a treatment discrepancy.

Of the two ways in which justice received and valued can be discrepant (i.e., deficiency and excess), cases of deficiency are likely to be worse (Chatman 1989, Kristof 1996, Edwards et al. 1998, Kristof-Brown et al. 2005). Yet excess should not be considered as an ideal situation either. Even when the level of justice received is high, employees will still consider situations of excess vis-à-vis their situated values that day (Edwards and Van Harrison 1993, Lambert et al. 2012), meaning that excess may not be beneficial (van den Bos and Lind 2002, Johnson et al. 2014, Sherf et al. 2019). Indeed, it may be the case that the situated values the employee
places on justice enactment may be at relatively lower levels for a number of reasons. For example, perhaps the employee does not value the outcome being distributed, does not want to have input on the procedures being established, is unconcerned with the information being shared, or does not like the supervisor and does not appreciate needing to interact with him or her (even if that interaction is “just”). Whatever the reason, receiving excess justice could lead employees to experience additional demands and burdens both cognitively and behaviorally (Scott et al. 2014). That is, receiving justice at a particular moment may pull the employee away from his or her primary task focus, triggering increased cognitive sensemaking in the form of treatment discrepancy (Beal et al. 2005) as the employee considers why this occurred and how he or she would have liked the situation to be different (Folger and Cropanzano 1998). Employees might also see the receipt of justice in excess of its situated values as an indication that the supervisor does not understand the employee or the employee’s circumstances (i.e., that the supervisor and employees are not seeing “eye-to-eye” in their relationship; see Matta et al. 2015). In addition, because justice has a social exchange component, its receipt may instantiate a sense of obligation for the employee to reciprocate (see, e.g., Colquitt et al. 2013).

Based on the above, moving from cases of excess toward situations of fit should also be associated with lower levels of treatment discrepancy (Edwards and Van Harrison 1993, Folger and Cropanzano 1998). If the employee’s situated value of justice enactment is similarly high at the time an employee receives higher levels of justice enactment, this should result in a lower level of treatment discrepancy, because the employee is unlikely to feel that they wish they had been treated differently. Indeed, the fit between supplies and what an employee wants at higher levels tends to be associated with the most positive outcomes (Edwards and Parry 1993, Kreiner 2006, Lambert et al. 2012). Thus, fit between justice received and the situated value of that justice results in the least mismatch “between the current state and the reference state” (Epstude and Roese 2008, p. 3).

In summary, considering the level of justice enactment received by an employee tells only half of the story. Instead, it is important to consider the interplay between the environmental supply of justice and the employee’s situated value of that justice. Accordingly, we posit that cases of incongruence (deficiency or excess) in the level of justice received and valued are likely to trigger increased levels of treatment discrepancy compared with cases of congruence. Phrased differently, treatment discrepancy will decrease as one moves from cases of deficiency toward fit, be minimized in cases of fit, and increase again as one moves from situations of fit to excess.

**Hypothesis 1.** Daily treatment discrepancies will be lower when justice received and justice valued are congruent (at high or low levels) compared to when justice received is deficient or exceeds justice valued.

Now holding incongruence constant, we focus on the comparison between deficiency and excess. P-E fit theory suggests that some organizational supplies can have properties that range on a continuum from synergistic to antagonistic (Edwards et al. 1998). Although deficient supplies generally elicit negative outcomes, the result of excess supplies is more dependent on the resource. Synergistic supplies can produce positive outcomes when received in excess, whereas antagonistic supplies tend to result in comparably negative outcomes when received in excess (Lambert et al. 2012). We posit that justice criteria enactment is moderately antagonistic, meaning that employees experience negative responses once supplies are received in excess; however, the result will not be as negative as when there are deficient supplies (Lambert et al. 2012). This is similar to how transformational leadership has previously been considered (see, e.g., Tepper et al. 2018) and in contrast with a construct like autonomy, which scholars have argued can be highly detrimental in both deficiency and excess (Edwards and Rothbard 1999). As stated in the previous section, excess justice enactment may not be beneficial (van den Bos and Lind 2002, Johnson et al. 2014, Sherf et al. 2019), and there are numerous reasons that an employee would not value justice enactment, some of which may be circumstantial (e.g., previous justice experiences) and some of which may be personal (e.g., perceptions of control). Research on P-E fit has argued that receiving too much of a resource, even an ostensibly positive one such as justice, can be fatiguing (LePine et al. 2004, Vogel et al. 2020). For example, recent research has shown that meaningfulness, an ostensibly positive attribute, can be fatiguing — and results in reduced engagement — when provided in situations of both deficiency and excess (Vogel et al. 2020). Similarly, employees who receive justice in excess of the situated value they place on it may see it as an exhausting experience that detracts from their more central tasks or reflects an out-of-touch supervisor (Matta et al. 2015).

Yet excess should still be preferable to deficiency, as even justice that is not valued in the current context could satisfy other needs for belonging, positive self-regard, and meaning (Cropanzano et al. 2001). In contrast, an absence of justice has effects that likely increase in severity when an employee has a strong situated value of justice enactment. When justice fails to reach valued levels, the resulting discrepancies may diminish the benefits of justice (Lawrence et al. 2002, Buckner 2010). These reactions trigger high levels of treatment discrepancy, as employees may have
expected a different outcome, believed that their treatment could have unfolded differently, or felt that the treatment violated some normative standard (Folger and Cropanzano 1998). Thus, in situations of incongruence, we expect higher levels of treatment discrepancy when levels of justice are deficient (vs. in excess).

**Hypothesis 2.** Daily treatment discrepancies will be higher when there is deficient justice enactment compared to excess justice enactment.

**Consequences for Behavioral Outcomes**

The P-E fit literature indicates that discrepancies of the sort previously discussed provide information that employees use as feedback to regulate their subsequent work behavior (Edwards 1992, Johnson et al. 2013), which has implications for task, extrarole, and counterproductive behaviors (Greguras and Diefendorff 2009, Iliescu et al. 2015, Tepper et al. 2018). Similarly, the justice literature has found that perceptions of treatment have robust and pervasive effects on task proficiency, helping, and counterproductive behaviors (Cohen-Charash and Spector 2001, Colquitt et al. 2013). Therefore, our use of P-E fit in the context of justice provides us with an expanded mediation framework for explaining how the effects of congruence between justice received and the situated value of justice criteria enactment ultimately influence task proficiency, personal helping, and retaliatory behavior (Kristof-Brown et al. 2005, Colquitt et al. 2006, Zapata-Phelan et al. 2009, van Dijke et al. 2010) via treatment discrepancy.

Treatment discrepancy has previously been linked to various outcomes task, extrarole, and counterproductive behaviors (see, e.g., Roese 1997, Shaw et al. 2003, Price et al. 2006, Zapata-Phelan et al. 2009). Following from this, we examine the downstream consequences of treatment discrepancy for employee task proficiency, personal helping, and retaliatory behaviors. First, treatment discrepancy diverts attention from work-related goals to less productive behaviors or negative cognitions (Beal et al. 2005, Nolen-Hoeksema et al. 2008). When discrepancies are detected, they attract attention and interrupt current goal pursuits. Thus, employees may miss opportunities for performing their jobs and helping others when considering how things could have been better. Second, treatment discrepancy can leave employees feeling frustrated and less happy about their current situation, causing them to retaliate by reducing their productive behavior and exhibiting harmful behavior (Greguras and Diefendorff 2009, Iliescu et al. 2015, Tepper et al. 2018). In summary, we propose that the congruence effects predicted in Hypotheses 1 and 2 will transmit via daily treatment discrepancy to task proficiency, personal helping, and retaliatory behavior.

**Hypothesis 3.** Daily treatment discrepancies will mediate the relations of daily congruence between justice valued and justice received with (a) task proficiency, (b) personal helping, and (c) retaliatory behavior.

**Study 1 Overview**

Because the receipt of justice can vary from one day to the next (see, e.g., Johnson et al. 2014, Scott et al. 2014, Matta et al. 2017) and because our theory implies that the employee’s situated value of justice similarly varies, we align theory and method by testing our hypotheses in a daily experience-sampling study. We assess situated values of justice enactment at the middle-of-the-workday (midday) justice behaviors received and treatment discrepancy at the end of the workday (end-day) and the behavioral outcomes on the next day (next-day). Doing so is beneficial for theoretical and empirical reasons. First, capturing whether justice values reported at midday are fulfilled by justice behaviors received later that day helps us to avoid potential self-serving or protective biases wherein reports of the value are altered based on actual justice enactment (for a comparable example, see Tepper et al. 2018). Second, we assessed outcomes the following day because it gives employees time to process these discrepancies and form reactions after the workday has ended and provides a more conservative test of our hypotheses. It is not uncommon for employees to reflect on their work experiences later in the evening, once work-related activities and interactions have ceased (Sonnentag and Grant 2012, Song et al. 2018). Third, and relatedly, measuring our focal constructs at different times allows us to mitigate common method variance and provides more robust evidence for our presumed casual order (Johnson et al. 2011, Podsakoff et al. 2012). Notably, our results are comparable if we utilize assessments of same-day behaviors rather than next-day behaviors.

**Study 1 Method**

**Participants and Procedure**

Our final sample comprised 145 full-time workers who were employed in a variety of industries (e.g., banking, education, manufacturing, and healthcare) and who held a wide range of job titles (e.g., consultant, teacher, data analyst, and nurse). The demographics were as follows: 41% were male, the majority were Caucasian (83%), average age was 40.8 years (SD = 14.4), and average organizational tenure was 9.4 years (SD = 10.3). After institutional review board approval for the study was obtained, students in a management course from a large U.S. university recruited a full-time employee (190 in total) to participate in our study in exchange for extra credit. We e-mailed each person to explain the requirements of the study and
collect their demographic data. Following this, we proceeded to send online daily surveys over a period of 15 consecutive workdays. During the daily portion of our study, employees received two surveys per day, one at the middle of the workday and one at the end of the workday. In the midday survey, we assessed justice valued to that point in the day. In the end-day survey, we assessed justice received and treatment discrepancy as well as the next-day behaviors (operationalized the following day).

Of the 190 individuals who agreed to participate in the study, 178 (93.7%) completed at least one of the daily midday surveys, 179 (94.2%) completed at least one of the daily end-day surveys, and 171 (90.0%) completed at least one set of daily surveys (both midday and end-day). In total, we received 1,822 midday surveys (10.2 average surveys per participant), 1,813 end-day surveys (10.1 surveys per participant), and 1,484 matched midday and end-day surveys (8.7 matched surveys per participant). To be included in our final sample, additional inclusion criteria were necessary. Because our mediator (i.e., treatment discrepancy) was modeled as predicting next-day outcome variables (i.e., task proficiency and helping and retaliatory behaviors), a valid case required that surveys were completed on successive days. This resulted in a final sample of 145 employees with 810 valid cases (on average, 5.6 per participant; standard deviation = 3.7; low = 2; high = 14).

**Measures**

Participants responded to all items using a five-point Likert scale (1 = strongly disagree, 5 = strongly agree). When short daily measures were unavailable, we followed recommendations from Beal (2015) and Uy et al. (2010) to shorten previously validated scales to reduce participant fatigue. This approach is common in experience-sampling studies (Gabriel et al. 2014, Johnson et al. 2014, Scott et al. 2014). Coefficient alphas were averaged across days.

**Justice Received and Justice Valued.** Following past atomistic operationalizations and tests of fit (French et al. 1982, Edwards and Van Harrison 1993, Edwards 1996, Edwards and Rothbard 1999, Cable and Edwards 2004, Edwards et al. 2006, Edwards and Cable 2009, Lambert et al. 2012), which examine perceptions of values and supplies as separate entities, we used parallel items to assess daily environmental supplies (i.e., justice received) and daily respondent values (i.e., situated value of justice criteria enactment). For the parallel items, we used Colquitt et al.’s (2015) three-item overall fairness scale. In line with previous atomistic approaches to fit, we assessed daily justice criteria enactment valued by asking how “important” each item was to participants in regard to the supervisor’s justice behavior that day and daily justice received by asking each item in regard to their supervisor’s “actual” justice behavior that day.

The daily justice value statements (α = 0.98) were “So far today, it was important to me that my supervisor act fairly toward me,” “So far today, it was important to me that my supervisor do things that are fair toward me,” and “So far today, it was important to me that my supervisor behave like a fair person would toward me.” The daily justice received statements (α = 0.97) were “So far today, my supervisor acted fairly toward me,” “So far today, my supervisor did things that were fair toward me,” and “So far today, my supervisor behaved like a fair person would toward me.”

**Treatment Discrepancy.** Following exemplars from the fit literature that capture treatment discrepancies by assessing fit between actual and ideal states (Judge and Cable 1997, Saks and Ashforth 1997, Cable and DeRue 2002, Edwards et al. 2006, Edwards and Cable 2009, Lambert et al. 2012), we used counterfactual thinking to capture treatment discrepancy (α = 0.96) using three items adapted from Spencer and Rupp (2009). Because counterfactual thinking represents a mismatch “between the current state and the reference state,” it is, by definition, an operationalization of the treatment discrepancy construct we discuss conceptually (Epstude and Roese 2008, p. 170). The items were “I would have preferred it if my supervisor had treated me differently from how he/she actually did,” “I believe my supervisor could have treated me differently from how he/she actually did,” and “I believe my supervisor should have treated me differently from how he/she actually did.”

**Behavioral Outcomes** We assessed task proficiency (α = 0.93) using the Griffin et al. (2007) three-item scale. Participants indicated their agreement with each statement for that day (e.g., “I ensured my tasks were completed properly”). We measured personal helping (α = 0.88) via three items developed by Settoon and Mossholder (2002). Participants reported their agreement with each statement for that day (e.g., “I took time to listen to a coworker’s problems and worries”). Finally, retaliatory behavior (α = 0.90) was measured with six items developed by Akaah (1996). Participants indicated their agreement with each statement for that day (e.g., “I used company resources for my own personal use”).

**Study 1: Analytic Strategy**

Multilevel Analyses

Because of the multilevel nature of our ESM data (daily observations nested within individuals), we
followed best practices (see, e.g., Beal and Weiss 2003, Fisher et al. 2012) to analyze our data using multilevel path analysis with Mplus 7. All within-person exogenous variables were centered within cluster (Enders and Tofghi 2007), and we used random slopes to test the paths in our model (for similar approaches, see Wang et al. 2011). Following best practice recommendations for ESM research, we controlled for prior-day task proficiency, personal helping, and retaliatory behaviors when predicting these outcome variables the next day, allowing us to assess changes in the level of these three variables from prior assessments (Johnson et al. 2014) and providing additional evidence for our hypothesized causal direction (Beal 2015).

**Polynomial Regressions**

In addition to the need to take into account the multilevel nature of data, because our predictions focused on congruence between justice received and justice valued (i.e., Hypotheses 1 and 2), we estimated a polynomial model (see, e.g., Edwards 2002, Edwards and Cable, 2009) in which daily treatment discrepancy was regressed on daily levels of justice valued ($V$), justice received ($R$), the product term between justice valued and received ($VR$), justice valued squared ($V^2$), and justice received squared ($R^2$). We then used the regression coefficients to plot a three-dimensional response surface in which justice received ($R$) and justice valued ($V$) were plotted on the perpendicular horizontal axes, and treatment discrepancy was plotted on the vertical axis (Edwards and Parry 1993) (see Figure 3). We further calculated and tested the statistical significance of several features of the response surface that provide support for the congruence effects forwarded in Hypotheses 1 and 2, specifically, the slopes and curvatures of the congruence line (the line where $V = R$) and incongruence line (the line where $V = -R$). In order to test the statistical significance of these features of the response surface, we used procedures for testing linear combinations of regression coefficients (Cohen et al. 1983, Edwards and Parry 1993).

**Testing of Hypothesis 1.** Hypothesis 1 predicted that daily treatment discrepancies will be lower when justice received and valued are congruent (at high or low levels) compared with when justice received is deficient of or exceeds justice valued. To support the congruence effect predicted by this hypothesis, the curvature along the incongruence line (the line where $V = -R$) must be positive (i.e., a U-shape). That is, treatment discrepancy must decrease as one moves from situations of treatment deficiency toward situations of fit between justice valued and received, be minimized in situations of fit between justice valued and received, and increase as one moves from situations of fit between justice valued and received to situations of excess (i.e., increases when justice received and justice desired diverge from congruent levels to either deficient or excess levels; see Edwards and Cable 2009).

**Testing of Hypothesis 2.** To support the deficiency and excess justice effects predicted in Hypothesis 2, the slope along the incongruence line (the line where $D = -R$) must be positive, such that a deficient level of justice results in a higher level of treatment discrepancy than an equivalently excess level of justice (for similar approaches, see Lambert et al. 2003, Montes and Irving 2008, Lambert et al. 2012). In other words, we tested whether a linear decrease in values of treatment discrepancy emerged moving from deficient to excess levels of justice received and valued.

**Testing Mediation.** We regressed each of our behavioral outcomes on treatment discrepancy, controlling for the direct effects of the five polynomial terms. In order to test the mediation of the polynomial effects on task proficiency, personal helping, and retaliatory behavior via treatment discrepancy (i.e., Hypothesis 3), we used the block variable approach recommended by Edwards and Cable (2009). Because mediation of congruence effects is determined not by a single parameter estimate but rather linear combinations of the five polynomial regression coefficients (e.g., Hypothesis 1 is based on a linear combination of the parameter estimates of the three second-order terms, whereas Hypothesis 2 is based on a linear combination of the parameter estimates of the two first-order terms), mediation must be tested by assessing the extent to which the joint effects of the five polynomial terms in conjunction transmit through the mediator to the outcome variable(s) (Edwards and Cable 2009). Following the block variable approach recommended specifically for this purpose (Edwards and Cable 2009), we estimated the overall path from the five justice received and justice valued polynomial terms to treatment discrepancy (i.e., the “a” path in the mediation model) by multiplying the estimated polynomial regression coefficients from the analysis with the raw data to create a block variable that represents the weighted linear composite of the path estimate of the relationship between the five justice received and justice valued polynomial terms and treatment discrepancy (Wilson et al. 2018).

After creating the block variable by generating a predicted value for each observation based on the estimated polynomial regression coefficients from the analysis (equivalent to $\hat{Y}$ from our polynomial regression equation), we then ran our analysis replacing the five polynomial terms with the block variable to estimate the “$a$” path in the mediation model. Importantly, because the block variable is computed from the original model’s coefficient estimates (Edwards
and Cable (2009), the variance explained by the block variable is exactly equal to the variance explained by the original model. Each path between treatment discrepancy and the outcomes represents the “p” paths in the mediation model. Following best practices for testing mediation in multilevel analyses, mediation of each of the within-person effects was tested with a parametric bootstrap using a Monte Carlo simulation for creating sampling distributions and bias-corrected 95% confidence intervals for indirect effects (for similar applications of this procedure, see Koopman et al. 2020b).

### Study 1 Results

Means, standard deviations, and correlations among the variables are reported in Table 1 (within-person correlations and coefficient alphas are reported below and on the diagonal, respectively). We first conducted a multilevel confirmatory factor analysis (CFA), which revealed that our proposed six-factor within-person model (i.e., justice received, justice valued, treatment discrepancy, task proficiency, helping, and retaliation) adequately fit the data: \( \chi^2(174) = 271.03 \) (\( p < 0.01 \)), CFI = 0.98, RMSEA = 0.03, and SRMR (within) = 0.04. All items loaded significantly on their corresponding factor. We compared this six-factor model to a five-factor model in which justice received and justice valued loaded on one factor. This model had poor fit: \( \chi^2(179) = 1,358.53 \) (\( p < 0.01 \)), CFI = 0.71, RMSEA = 0.09, and SRMR (within) = 0.13, and it added significant misfit: Satorra-Bentler Scaled \( \Delta \chi^2(\Delta df = 5) = 215.09 \). To estimate proportions of between- and within-person variance, we ran a series of null models. For each construct, a significant proportion of the variance resided within-individuals: 50.4% (justice valued), 57.2% (justice received), 48.2% (treatment discrepancy), 48.4% (task proficiency), 53.5% (personal helping), and 29.3% (retaliatory behaviors). Each of our focal constructs thus varies meaningfully within persons.

### Tests of Hypotheses

Results of the within-person polynomial path analysis are presented in Table 2, and the three-dimensional response surface plot is shown in Figure 2. Hypothesis 1 predicted that daily treatment discrepancies will be lower when justice received and justice valued are congruent (at high or low levels) compared with when justice received is deficient of or exceeds justice valued. As it pertains to the features of the response surface described in the “Testing of Hypothesis 1” section under “Study 1: Analytic Strategy,” this prediction reflects a positive curvature (i.e., a U-shape) along the incongruence line (the line where \( D = -R \)). As shown in Table 2, the curvature along the incongruence line was positive and significant (curvature = 0.42, \( p < 0.01 \)), indicating that the level of treatment discrepancy decreased moving from deficient to congruent levels of justice received and valued and increased moving from congruent to excess levels of justice received and valued. The response surface plot in Figure 2 confirms this prediction, as individuals reported higher levels of treatment discrepancy on days in which they received deficient or excess levels of justice in comparison with congruent justice received and valued.

Hypothesis 2 predicted that daily treatment discrepancy is higher when there is a low level of justice received and a high level of justice valued (i.e., deficiency) in comparison with when there is a high level of justice received and a low level of justice valued (i.e., excess). As described in “Testing of Hypothesis 2” section under “Study 1: Analytic Strategy,” this prediction reflects a positive slope in the response surface along the incongruence line (the line where \( D = -R \)). As shown in Table 2, the slope along the incongruence line was positive and significant (slope = 0.48, \( p < 0.01 \)), demonstrating that a deficient level of justice resulted in higher levels of treatment discrepancy than an equivalently excess level of justice. The response surface plot in Figure 2 confirms this prediction, as individuals reported higher levels of treatment discrepancy on days in which they valued a higher level of justice than they received in comparison with when they received more justice than they valued.

Hypothesis 3 posited that daily treatment discrepancy mediates the effects of daily congruence between justice received and valued and (a) task proficiency, (b) personal helping, and (c) retaliatory behavior. To
Table 2. Study 1 Results of Within-Person Polynomial Path Analysis

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>Treatment discrepancy end-day</th>
<th>Task proficiency next-day</th>
<th>Personal helping next-day</th>
<th>Retaliatory behavior next-day</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>( \gamma )</td>
<td>SE</td>
<td>( \gamma )</td>
<td>SE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intercept</td>
<td>2.25**</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>3.56**</td>
<td>0.31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Polynomial equation coefficients</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Justice Valued (V) — midday</td>
<td>( -0.01 )</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Justice Received (R) — end-day</td>
<td>( -0.49** )</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>( -0.02 )</td>
<td>0.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( V^2 )</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>0.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( V^*R )</td>
<td>( -0.24** )</td>
<td>0.09</td>
<td>( -0.05 )</td>
<td>0.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( R^2 )</td>
<td>0.12†</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>0.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Autoregressive controls</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Task proficiency — end-day</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>( 0.20^\ast)</td>
<td>0.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personal helping — end-day</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Retaliatory behavior — end-day</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mediator</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Treatment discrepancy — end-day</td>
<td>( -0.09^\ast)</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>( -0.08^\dagger)</td>
<td>0.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Congruence line of response surface</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slope</td>
<td>( -0.50^\ast)</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Curvature</td>
<td>( -0.07 )</td>
<td>0.11</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>0.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Incongruence line of response surface</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slope</td>
<td>( 0.48^\ast)</td>
<td>0.09</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>0.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Curvature</td>
<td>( 0.42^\ast)</td>
<td>0.14</td>
<td>0.15</td>
<td>0.12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Variance explained</td>
<td>30.7%</td>
<td></td>
<td>16.9%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes. Level 1, \( n = 805 \); level 2, \( N = 145 \); Hypothesized coefficients are in boldface. Components of contextualized justice are gray because they are not hypothesized. Controlling for the current-day assessment of next-day criteria constructs allows our results to be interpreted as a change from the current day.
test the mediating effect of treatment discrepancy on the relationship of justice received and valued congruence (and incongruence) with outcomes, we calculated the “$\alpha$” and “$\beta$” paths for a mediation model using the block variable approach described in detail under “Study 1: Analytic Strategy” (Edwards and Cable 2009), converting the five polynomial terms into one weighted linear composite and bootstrapping the indirect effect. The results of the bootstrapping analysis support Hypothesis 3a, as the indirect effect of justice received and valued congruence on task proficiency via treatment discrepancy was $-0.089$, and the 95% confidence interval (CI) excluded zero ($-0.150$, $-0.037$). We failed to support Hypothesis 3b, because the $\beta$-path was not significant at $p < 0.05$ ($\gamma = -0.08$, $p < 0.10$). The results of the bootstrapping analysis support Hypothesis 3c, because the indirect effect of justice received and valued congruence on retaliatory behavior via treatment discrepancy was $0.061$, and the 95% CI excluded zero ($0.013$, $0.111$). In summary, partial support was observed for Hypothesis 3.

**Supplementary Analyses.** We also reanalyzed our model integrating various control variables. First, we reanalyzed the data accounting for the day of the week as well as the sine and cosine of that variable, which allows us to mitigate concerns over temporal ordering (e.g., day of the week effects, cyclical variation, successive vs. nonsuccessive days, etc.) (for a discussion, see Gabriel et al. 2019). The result of re-estimating our model controlling for potential temporal ordering and cyclical variation effects resulted in no changes in the results of our hypothesis tests. Second, we examined resource depletion (Baumeister et al. 2007, Lanaj et al. 2014) and negative affect (Lyubomirsky et al. 2005, Shockley et al. 2012) as potential day level controls. Controlling for depletion and/or negative affect results in no changes in terms of the results of our hypothesis tests. We note that depletion is negatively related to task proficiency ($\gamma = -0.10$, $p < 0.05$) but not helping ($\gamma = -0.02$, $ns$) or retaliatory behavior ($\gamma = 0.04$, $ns$), and negative affect is negatively related to task proficiency ($\gamma = -0.10$, $p < 0.05$) but not helping ($\gamma = -0.07$, $ns$) or retaliatory behavior ($\gamma = 0.15$, $ns$).

**Study 1 Discussion**
In support of our hypotheses, employees experienced a great deal of within-person variance in the situated value they place on justice from one workday to the next, consistent with our notion that this value is a context- and time-dependent situated cognition that fluctuates based on current goals and knowledge in working memory (Skitka 2003, Johnson et al. 2006b). We also found that incongruence between justice received and employees’ situated value of justice enactment led to a higher level of treatment discrepancy and, subsequently, a decrease in employees’ task proficiency behavior and an increase in their retaliatory behavior. Despite these encouraging results, this study has some limitations. First, our mediator in Study 1 (treatment discrepancy) does not allow us to theorize fully about or empirically examine the differences between excess and deficiency as potentially different types of discrepancies. Moreover, polynomial regression allows us to measure discrepancy, but is not tailored toward examining potentially differing mechanisms flowing from
excess and deficiency. Finally, we measured overall fairness in Study 1 rather than latent justice enactment (which captures all four dimensions of justice and then creates a composite). Recent research has noted that overall measures may disproportionately oversample from specific justice dimensions (Colquitt 2012, Colquitt and Rodell 2015). These limitations are important to address, and so we turn now to a second study intended to accomplish this.

Study 2: Theoretical Development

The P-E fit literature argues that there are often differences between excess and deficiency that have consequences for resource fulfillment (Lambert et al. 2012). In other words, although both excess and deficiency may negatively affect work outcomes, the processes through which these outcomes are affected may vary based on the form of discrepancy. More specifically, because reactions to justice enactment can be...
deliberative and cognitive and/or impulsive and emotional (Dulebohn et al. 2009, Skarlicki and Rupp 2010, Colquitt et al. 2012), we build theory explaining why excess justice enactment triggers more cognitive reactions to justice, whereas deficient justice enactment triggers more emotional reactions to justice, with the expectation that both mechanisms will influence the downstream outcomes.

We examine two separate reactions to justice criteria enactment: cognitive reactions (e.g. rumination) and affective reactions (e.g. positive affect). Separating justice’s influence into these two components allows us to both be consistent with past justice theorizing (Dulebohn et al. 2009, Scott et al. 2009, Colquitt et al. 2012) and also build new theory concerning the influence of deficiency and excess on reactions to justice. Dual processing models of information processing and behavior (see, e.g., Smith and DeCoster 2000, Strack and Deutsch 2004) suggest that responses to environmental stimuli are governed by two systems: one that is more cognitive, deliberative, and “reflective” in nature and one that is more emotional, impulsive, and “reflexive.” This distinction also exists at the neurological level (Satpute and Lieberman 2006), and initial evidence suggests that the neurological responses to justice stimuli invoke processing in both systems (Satpute and Lieberman 2006, Dulebohn et al. 2009). Indeed, Dulebohn et al. (2009) perceived these process differences to be significant enough to recommend that managers “tailor their communication about decisions” to differentially “counteract either emotional or cognitive negative reactions” from employees (p. 140).

Specifically, cognitive reactions to justice enactment activate areas of the brain centered around social processing, reflective thinking, reappraisal, and the suppression of emotional responses (Ochsner et al. 2002, Eisenberger et al. 2003, Sanfey 2007, Tabibnia et al. 2008). In this case, given the focus on deliberative, reflective thinking, and the reappraisal and revisiting of situational information to gain a better understanding of social dynamics, rumination serves as a marker of activity in the reflective system (Ochsner et al. 2002, Eisenberger et al. 2003, Gallagher and Frith 2003, Pelphrey et al. 2004). Emotional reactions to justice enactment, in contrast, activate areas of the brain centered around affective monitoring, distress, autonomic arousal, and faster information processing (Critchley et al. 2000, Damasio et al. 2000, Botvinick et al. 2004, Kerns et al. 2004, Nitschke et al. 2006). In our model, positive affect is a marker of processing in the emotional, reflexive system, and to this point, decreases in positive affect serve as a signal that one’s actual state is moving away from a desired state (Carver and Scheier 1981). Importantly, both ruminative thinking and affect are also previously examined outcomes of justice enactment (Brebels et al. 2013, Colquitt et al. 2013) and value discrepancy (P-E fit) (Lawrence et al. 2002).

As it pertains to excess, our conceptualization of justice as a moderately antagonistic resource suggests that individuals cannot store prior enactment for later use. In addition, excess supply of a resource such as justice may actually portend possible negative occurrences such as being distracted from one’s current task, receiving less justice in the future (van den Bos and Lind 2002, Johnson et al. 2014, Sherf et al. 2019), and a lack of understanding in the relationship between an employee and their supervisor (Matta et al. 2015). These results are characterized by reflective, deliberative, and ruminative processes as one contemplates the ways in which this excess justice is more of a burden than a gift (Ochsner et al. 2002, Eisenberger et al. 2003, Sanfey 2007, Tabibnia et al. 2008).

Research on cognitive rumination and self-regulation suggests that “rumination is initiated by perceived discrepancies between one’s current state or situation and a goal or desired state” (Nolen-Hoeksema et al. 2008, pp. 414–415) and is characterized by “thinking attentively, repetitively, or frequently” about the discrepancy and its repercussions (Segerstrom et al. 2003, p. 909). Put differently, rumination is thought to arise as a response to goal failure (Martin et al. 1993). Typically, arguments from the P-E fit literature would suggest that in situations of value discrepancy, employees are motivated to fix the situation. However, unlike in contexts of deficiency (which have more direct action-oriented responses), in contexts of excess justice enactment, an employee is confronted with an unclear and unusual situation that spurs a slow, reflective, deliberative process of analysis to understand why this unusual event happened. That is, excess justice cannot be removed (as opposed to deficient justice, which, with the right response, could be increased). As a result, employees may experience feelings of passivity or uncertainty combined with a reduced sense of efficacy about how to remedy the referent situation (Smith and Alloy 2009). Thus, absent a clear way to remedy the situation, the employee may instead ruminate on it. Indeed, rumination is fundamentally “an attempt at discrepancy reduction,” but one that occurs in situations where the ability to prevent the discrepancy from taking place has passed, and it is unclear how to prevent it from happening again (Carver and Scheier 1998, p. 231). For example, the employee may find it difficult to explain their low value of justice enactment to their supervisor (saying things like “I do not care about this outcome” or “I am too busy to speak with you on this matter” may not be socially appropriate). Additionally, an employee may dwell on why their supervisor does not understand their situated values but also may not want to discourage them from high levels of justice.
enactment (even in excess) for fear that they will not receive justice at some valued point in the future. In other words, “even though the best chances of addressing the triggering event… has passed, the event-related information keeps activating” (Wang et al. 2013, p. 990). This is ultimately self-defeating, however, because even though individuals may feel they are “gaining insight” by “attending to the details of the negative interaction,” rumination may actually perpetuate their fixation on the incident (Martin et al. 1993, Wang et al. 2013, p. 991). In this way, receiving higher levels of justice can have negative consequences for employees.

Next, we discuss conditions of deficiency. Unlike cognitive responses such as rumination (which are slower and more reflective), research on dual processing models argue that responses to deficiency are more likely characterized by affective, reflexive, fast systems focused on automatic social cognitions (Lawrence et al. 2002, Evans 2008, Chaiken and Lederwood 2011). As such, affective responses like those brought on by deficient justice occur in order to spur immediate action or effort, and “retrieve a schema that provides a solution” (Forgas 1995, Evans 2008, p. 267, Foo et al. 2009). To this end, we examine positive affect, given its role as a signal of aversive and discrepant conditions (Carver and Scheier 1998).

Emotions have long been shown to be an important mechanism linking justice-related experiences with behavioral responses (Weiss et al. 1996, Cropanzano et al. 2000, Barclay et al. 2005). This includes the justice literature, wherein scholars have demonstrated that lower levels of justice enactment are associated with reduced positive affect (Colquitt et al. 2013). An explanation for this comes from theories of self-regulation (Higgins 1987, Carver and Scheier 1998, Johnson et al. 2006a), which posit that goal-striving processes are imbued with effect. When negative discrepancies are detected between what is valued and what is actually received, a reduction in positive affect is experienced (Alliger and Williams 1993, Lawrence et al. 2002, Johnson et al. 2010). Stated in terms of our model, when employees place high value on justice enactment, this represents a desired state. When they experience low levels of enactment, the resulting deficiency signals movement away from that valued state. Thus, we argue that experiencing deficient levels of justice enactment leads to an emotional and reflexive response and reduces positive affect (Bies and Moag 1986, Tripp et al. 2002, Botvinick et al. 2004, Barclay et al. 2005, Nitschke et al. 2006).

Finally, we argue that these mechanisms influence our original behavioral outcomes in a manner similar to what we hypothesize in Study 1. Research has shown that rumination decreases job performance, because the distraction and preoccupation that characterize rumination also decrease concentration, instrumental behaviors, and problem solving and increase errors and biases in information processing (Lyubomirsky and Nolen-Hoeksema 1993, Lyubomirsky et al. 1999, Ward et al. 2003, Bushman et al. 2005, Watkins and Moulds 2005). Rumination has also been linked to antisocial and “vengeful” responses that are counterproductive in nature and diminish their relationships (Nolen-Hoeksema and Davis 1999). Similarly, rumination has been shown to be a self-focused reaction, reducing consideration of others and increasing consideration for the self (Joireman et al. 2002). Consequently, we also predict rumination to decrease personal helping. Turning to positive affect, research has shown a strong connection to increased performance (Tsai et al. 2007, Miner and Glomb 2010, Colquitt et al. 2015) and also decreases in counterproductive work behaviors (Colquitt et al. 2015). State positive affect has also been shown to have a strong positive effect on helping behaviors (Carlson et al. 1988, Lyubomirsky et al. 2005). Therefore, we argue that increased rumination and reduced positive affect are both associated with decreased task proficiency and personal helping and increased retaliatory behavior.

**Hypothesis 4.** Rumination will mediate the relationship between excess enacted justice and (a) task proficiency, (b) personal helping, and (c) retaliatory behavior.

**Hypothesis 5.** Positive affect will mediate the relationship between deficient enacted justice and (a) task proficiency, (b) personal helping, and (c) retaliatory behavior.

**Study 2: Overview**

As we again examine justice enactment as it varies day to day, and our theory implies that the situated value of enacted justice criteria similarly varies, we align theory and method by collecting data in an experience-sampling study. We assess excess and deficient justice enactment at the middle of the workday (midday) and the cognitive and affective responses to justice as well as the behavioral outcomes at the end of the work day (end-day). Measuring our focal constructs at different times allows us to mitigate concerns of common method variance and provides more robust evidence for our presumed casual order (Johnson et al. 2011, Podsakoff et al. 2012). Moreover, by collecting data in the same day, we are able to examine our effects within rather than across days while still retaining time separation.

**Study 2 Method**

**Participants and Procedure**

Our final sample comprised 88 full-time workers who were employed in a variety of industries (e.g., education, banking, marketing) and who held a wide range of job titles (e.g., dispatcher, office manager, technology sales). The demographics were as follows: 34%
were male, the majority were Caucasian (70%), average age was 37 years (SD = 14.2), and average tenure in the current job was five years (SD = 10.3). Students in a management course from a large U.S. university recruited a full-time employee (95 in total) to participate in our study in exchange for extra credit. All procedures in this study were the same as the first. Of the 95 individuals who agreed to participate in the study, 85 (89.57%) completed at least one of the daily morning surveys (morning), 84 (88.4%) completed at least one of the daily afternoon surveys (midday), 85 (89.5%) completed at least one of the daily end-of-day surveys (endday), and 77 (81.1%) completed at least one set of daily surveys (morning, midday, and end-day). In total, we received 844 morning surveys (8.9 average surveys per participant), 836 midday surveys (8.8 surveys per participant), 804 end-day surveys (8.5 surveys per participant), and 486 matched morning, midday, and end-day surveys (6.3 matched surveys per participant). This resulted in a final sample of 77 employees with 486 valid cases (on average, 6.3 per participant; standard deviation = 4.07; low = 2; high = 15).

### Measures
Participants responded to all items using a five-point Likert scale (1 = strongly disagree, 5 = strongly agree) unless indicated otherwise. When short daily measures were not available, we again followed recommendations from Beal (2015) and Uy et al. (2010) to shorten previously validated scales to reduce participant fatigue. Coefficient alphas were averaged across days. Task proficiency (α = 0.93), personal helping (α = 0.91), and retaliatory behavior (α = 0.87) were measured using the same scales as in Study 1.

### Excess Justice Enactment
Following past molecular operationalizations and tests of fit (French et al. 1982, Edwards and Van Harrison 1993, Edwards 1996, Edwards and Rothbard 1999, Cable and Edwards 2004, Edwards et al. 2006, Edwards and Cable 2009, Lambert et al. 2012), which assess directional discrepancies between values and supplies (i.e., allow one to distinguish excess and discrepancy), we assessed daily molecular fit by asking, from a scale of “much less than I wanted” to “much more than I wanted,” how much each behavior the supervisor provided the participant that day fit with how much the participant personally wanted. The measures were developed using the same composite of four different three-item justice scales. Samples of the daily molecular justice items were “Compared to how much I wanted it, my supervisor distributed outcomes based on the effort I have put into my work” (distributive justice), “Compared to how much I wanted it, my supervisor gave me opportunities to exert influence over a work decision or action” (procedural justice), “Compared to how much I wanted it, my supervisor was candid in communications with me” (informational justice), and “Compared to how much I wanted it, my supervisor treated me in a polite manner” (interpersonal justice). Deficient justice enactment was scored 0 (if rated as excess or at congruent levels), 1 (if rated as less than I wanted), or 2 (if rated as much less than I wanted), and excess justice enactment was scored 0 (if rated as deficient or at congruent levels), 1 (if rated as more than I wanted), or 2 (if rated as much more than I wanted) (for similar approaches, see Umphress et al. 2003, Venkataramani and Dalal 2007).

**Rumination.** We assessed rumination (α = 0.97) using the McCullough et al. (2007) three-item scale. Participants indicated their agreement with each statement for that day (e.g., “Since taking the previous survey today, I couldn’t stop thinking about my supervisor’s actions toward me”).

**Positive Affect** We assessed positive affect (α = 0.95) using five items from the Positive and Negative Affect Schedule (PANAS) by Watson et al. (1988). Participants indicated the extent to which each word described how they felt right now (e.g., “inspired”).

### Measures to Test Correspondence With Contextualized Components of Justice from Study 1
Given that our operationalizations of justice differed from Study 1 (i.e., excess and deficient justice rather than the two contextualized components of justice valued and justice received), we also collected the contextualized components from Study 1 to establish that excess and deficient justice flow from the contextualized components.

### Study 2: Analytic Strategy

**Multilevel Analyses**
Because of the multilevel nature of our ESM data (daily observations nested within individuals), we followed best practices (e.g., Beal and Weiss 2003, Fisher et al. 2012) to analyze our data using multilevel path analysis with Mplus 7. All within-person exogenous variables were centered within cluster (Enders and Tofghi 2007), and we used random slopes to test the paths in our model (for similar approaches, see Wang et al. 2011). Following best practice recommendations for ESM research, we controlled for prior-day rumination, positive affect, task proficiency, personal helping, and retaliatory behaviors when predicting these outcome variables, allowing us to assess changes in the level of these three variables from prior assessments (Johnson et al. 2014) and providing additional evidence for our hypothesized causal direction (Beal 2015).
Different Outcomes of Deficiency Versus Excess
In Study 1, we relied on polynomial regression to show that treatment discrepancies (regardless of the direction of the discrepancy) increase when one moves away from fit in either direction (i.e., toward either deficiency or excess). However, polynomial regression is not tailored toward examining two differential outcomes of excess and deficiency. Thus, in Study 2, we implemented an approach allowing us to tease apart these differences. Specifically, to test the mediation predictions forwarded in Hypotheses 4 and 5 (expanding out of our original Hypotheses 2 and 3), we examined whether our two different forms of justice discrepancies — excess and deficiency — flow through different mediating mechanisms (ruminating and positive affect) in influencing our downstream behaviors (i.e., task proficiency, helping, and retaliation).

Study 2 Results
Means, standard deviations, and correlations among the variables are reported in Table 3 (within-person correlations and coefficient alphas are reported below and on the diagonal, respectively). Because of the number of items exceeding recommendations for estimating measurement models (Kline 2011), we used item parcels by justice dimension for justice exceeding or falling short of justice enactment values. We first conducted a multilevel CFA, which revealed that our proposed eight-factor within-person model (i.e., justice received, justice valued, excess or deficient justice enactment, rumination, positive affect, task proficiency, helping, and retaliation) adequately fit the data: $\chi^2(436) = 747.06 \ (p < 0.01)$, CFI = 0.91, RMSEA = 0.04, and SRMR (within) = 0.04. All items loaded significantly on their corresponding factor. We compared this eight-factor model to a seven-factor model in which justice received and justice valued loaded on one factor. This model had poor fit, $\chi^2(443) = 1028.14 \ (p < 0.01)$, CFI = 0.83, RMSEA = 0.05, and SRMR (within) = 0.06, and it added significant misfit: Satorra-Bentler Scaled $\chi^2$ ($\Delta df = 7$) = 429.41. We also compared our eight-factor model to a seven-factor model in which justice received and excess or deficient justice enactment loaded on one factor. This model had poor fit, $\chi^2(443) = 1020.21 \ (p < 0.01)$, CFI = 0.83, RMSEA = 0.05, and SRMR (within) = 0.06, and it added significant misfit: Sattora-Bentler Scaled $\chi^2$ ($\Delta df = 7$) = 629.35. To estimate proportions of between- and within-person variance, we ran a series of null models. For each construct, a significant proportion of the variance resided within individuals: 78.6% (excess justice enactment), 46.4% (deficient justice enactment), 47.8% (rumination), 34.6% (positive affect), 61.1% (task proficiency), 58.2% (personal helping), and 42.8% (retaliatory behaviors). Each of our focal constructs thus varies meaningfully within persons.

Results of the within-person path analysis are presented in Table 4. Hypothesis 4 predicted that rumination will mediate the relationship between excess enacted justice and (a) task proficiency, (b) personal helping, and (c) retaliatory behavior, and Hypothesis 5 predicted that positive affect will mediate the relationship between deficient enacted justice and (a) task proficiency, (b) personal helping, and (c) retaliatory behavior. Our results show that excess justice enactment was positively associated with rumination ($\gamma = 0.16, p < 0.05$) but not related to positive affect ($\gamma = -0.26, ns$), and deficient justice enactment was negatively associated with positive affect ($\gamma = -0.28, p < 0.05$) but not related to rumination ($\gamma = -0.02, ns$). Thus, excess justice enactment impacted the cognitive reaction to justice enactment, whereas deficient justice enactment impacted the affective reaction to justice enactment. In turn, rumination was negatively associated with task proficiency ($\gamma = -0.17, p < 0.01$) and positively associated with retaliatory behavior ($\gamma = 0.14, p < 0.05$) but unrelated to personal helping ($\gamma = -0.03, ns$). Positive affect was positively associated with task proficiency ($\gamma = 0.16, p < 0.01$) and personal helping ($\gamma = 0.14, p < 0.01$) but only marginally negatively associated with

### Table 3. Study 2 Descriptive Statistics and Within-Person Correlations Among the Focal Variables

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>SD-w</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
<th>6</th>
<th>7</th>
<th>8</th>
<th>9</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Justice valued (V) — morning</td>
<td>4.15</td>
<td>0.47</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Justice received (R) — midday</td>
<td>3.92</td>
<td>0.49</td>
<td>0.28*</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Excess justice — midday</td>
<td>3.10</td>
<td>0.32</td>
<td>0.08</td>
<td>0.18*</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deficient justice — midday</td>
<td>3.07</td>
<td>0.20</td>
<td>0.09*</td>
<td>-0.16*</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ruminating — end-day</td>
<td>1.78</td>
<td>1.01</td>
<td>-0.19*</td>
<td>-0.20*</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Positive affect — end-day</td>
<td>2.94</td>
<td>1.13</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td>-0.15*</td>
<td>-0.24*</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Task proficiency — end-day</td>
<td>4.32</td>
<td>0.89</td>
<td>0.08</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>-0.02</td>
<td>-0.14*</td>
<td>-0.39*</td>
<td>-0.31*</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personal helping — end-day</td>
<td>3.92</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>-0.01</td>
<td>0.08</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.18*</td>
<td>0.24*</td>
<td>0.45*</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Retaliatory behavior — end-day</td>
<td>1.53</td>
<td>0.83</td>
<td>-0.09*</td>
<td>-0.11*</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>0.32*</td>
<td>-0.23*</td>
<td>-0.41*</td>
<td>-0.22*</td>
<td>(0.87)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes. Level 1, $n = 486$; level 2, $N = 77$. Coefficient alphas are reported in parentheses along the diagonal. Components of contextualized justice are gray. Justice valued (V) and justice received (R) were measured to test correspondence with contextualized components of justice from Study 1. Their correlations are italicized.

*p < 0.05.
### Table 4. Study 2 Results of Within-Person Path Analysis

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>Perception of justice received exceeding justice needs midday</th>
<th>Perception of justice received falling short of justice needs midday</th>
<th>Rumination end-day</th>
<th>Positive affect end-day</th>
<th>Task performance end-day</th>
<th>Personal helping end-day</th>
<th>Retaliatory behavior end-day</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>$\gamma$</td>
<td>SE</td>
<td>$\gamma$</td>
<td>SE</td>
<td>$\gamma$</td>
<td>SE</td>
<td>$\gamma$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intercept</td>
<td>3.11**</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>3.06**</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>2.03**</td>
<td>0.86</td>
<td>3.90**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Components of contextualized justice</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Justice valued ($V$) — morning</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.06*</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>−0.26*</td>
<td>0.11</td>
<td>0.22**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Justice received ($R$) — midday</td>
<td>0.12**</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>−0.09**</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>−0.36**</td>
<td>0.08</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Autoregressive controls</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ruminatoin — previous</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Positive affect — previous</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Task proficiency — previous</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personal helping — previous</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Retaliatory behavior — previous</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Excess and deficient justice</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Excess justice — midday</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deficient justice — midday</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Benefits of justice</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ruminatoin — end-day</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Positive affect — end-day</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Linear combination of regression coefficients</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$D - R$</td>
<td>−0.11**</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>0.15**</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>0.10</td>
<td>0.14</td>
<td>0.23†</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Variance explained</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pseudo-$R^2$</td>
<td>23.1%</td>
<td>42.4%</td>
<td>13.4%</td>
<td>2.7%</td>
<td>1.7%</td>
<td>0.2%</td>
<td>9.9%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
retratatory behavior \( (\gamma = -0.07, p < 0.10) \). Bootstrap tests of mediation revealed that the indirect effect of excess justice enactment on task proficiency via rumination was \(-0.027\), and the 95% CI excluded zero \((-0.077, -0.001)\). For excess justice enactment on personal helping via rumination, mediation was not supported because the \( \beta \)-path was not significant \( (\gamma = -0.03, ns) \). The indirect effect of excess justice enactment on retaliatory behavior via rumination was \( 0.022\), and the 95% CI excluded zero \((0.002, 0.061)\). In summary, partial support was observed for Hypothesis 4. Bootstrap tests of mediation revealed that the indirect effect of deficient justice enactment on task proficiency via positive affect was \( 0.045\), and the 95% CI excluded zero \((-0.105, -0.007)\). The indirect effect of deficient justice enactment on personal helping via positive affect was \(-0.040\), and the 95% CI excluded zero \((-0.111, -0.005)\). For deficient justice enactment on retaliatory behavior via positive affect, we failed to support mediation because the \( \beta \)-path was not significant at \( p < 0.05 \) \( (\gamma = -0.07, p < 0.10) \). Thus, we found partial support for Hypothesis 5.

Given that our operationalizations of justice differed from Study 1 (i.e., excess and deficient justice rather than the two contextualized components of justice valued and justice received), as noted in the Study 2 Method section, we also collected the contextualized components from Study 1 to establish that excess and deficient justice flow from the contextualized components. In line with our theorizing and predictions for Hypothesis 1, as perceptions of justice received exceeded perceptions of justice valued (contextualized component ratings from Study 1), employee ratings of excess justice (ratings from Study 2) increased \( (D - R = 0.11, p < 0.01) \). Similarly, as perceptions of justice received fell short of perceptions of justice valued (contextualized component ratings from Study 1), employee ratings of deficient justice (ratings from Study 2) increased \( (N - R = 0.15, p < 0.01) \). Thus, Study 2 ratings of excess and deficient justice align with the contextualized components of justice valued and received from Study 1 in the predicted directions.

**Supplementary Analyses**

We also reanalyzed our model integrating various control variables. First, we reanalyzed the data accounting for the day of the week as well as the sine and cosine of that variable, which allows us to mitigate concerns over temporal ordering (e.g., day of the week effects, cyclical variation, successive vs. nonsuccessive days, etc.) (for a discussion, see Gabriel et al. 2019). The result of re-estimating our model controlling for these effects resulted in no changes in the results of our hypothesis tests. Second, we examined resource depletion (Baumeister et al. 2007, Lanaj et al. 2014) and negative affect (Lyubomirsky et al. 2005, Shockley et al. 2012) as potential day-level controls. Controlling for depletion and/or negative affect did not alter the results of our hypothesis tests. Depletion was negatively related to task proficiency \( (\gamma = -0.09, p < 0.05) \), marginally positively related to retaliatory behavior \( (\gamma = 0.04, p < 0.10) \), and not related to helping \( (\gamma = -0.04, ns) \), whereas negative affect was unrelated to task proficiency \( (\gamma = -0.05, ns) \), personal helping \( (\gamma = -0.06, ns) \), and retaliatory behavior \( (\gamma = 0.01, ns) \).

**Supplementary Analyses of Antecedents of Situated Justice Values**

Although not explicitly hypothesized, we also investigated potential antecedents that might predict daily variability in situated justice enactment values in both Studies 1 and 2. Indeed, given the observed importance of justice values in both studies, we thought it prudent to explore what may drive deviations in the daily situated value employees place on justice. In an exploratory fashion, we found that there were both situation- and person-based antecedents that predicted the situated value of justice in the morning; however, these findings varied across the two studies. In Study 1, exploratory analyses revealed that perceptions of control were negatively related to justice valued \( (\gamma = -0.20, p < 0.01) \). This finding is in line with uncertainty management theory (Lind and van den Bos 2002, van den Bos and Lind 2002), which suggests that a lack of control increases the salience of justice to individuals. In Study 2, exploratory analyses revealed that previous-day justice received was positively associated with the situated value for justice on the current day \( (\gamma = 0.18, p < 0.05) \). This suggests that receiving high levels of justice on a previous day increases the salience of justice the subsequent day and that receiving lower levels of justice may lead people to lower their expectations of — and perhaps value for — justice the next day. Given the exploratory nature of these findings, however, we recommend that future work focus specifically on triggers of situated justice values.

**General Discussion**

The justice literature has generally assumed that supervisors should strive to consistently adhere to justice enactment rules and that the value employees place on that enactment is stable and universal for employees across days. The former assumption has been the subject of considerable research (see, e.g., Sherf et al. 2019), and as regards the latter, we observed a great deal of within-person variance in employees’ situated value from one workday to the next. In combination, this suggests not only that supervisors do not always prioritize justice enactment but that employees...
do always prioritize its receipt. Our question was, in this instance, what happens when employees receive more or less justice than they currently value? Based on our use of P-E fit theory, we found that incongruence between justice received and justice valued led to a higher level of treatment discrepancy and, subsequently, a decrease in employees’ task proficiency behavior and an increase in their retaliatory behavior. We also found that the relationship between excess or deficient justice criteria enactment and behavioral outcomes is mediated by changes in cognitive (rumination) and affective (positive affect) responses to justice. More specifically, an excess of justice enactment was associated with an increase in rumination, whereas a deficiency of justice enactment was associated with a decrease in positive affect.

**Theoretical and Practical Implications**

Our examination of justice received and valued produced several interesting results, which enrich current knowledge of organizational justice. First, consistent with P-E fit, employees experience lower levels of treatment discrepancy on days when justice received and valued are congruent compared with days where justice received and valued are incongruent. That is, treatment discrepancy decreased as one moved from situations of justice deficiency toward situations of fit between justice valued and received, was minimized in situations of fit between justice valued and received, and increased as one moved from situations of fit between justice valued and received to situations of excess. Moreover, our findings reveal that receiving justice is not entirely positive, nor is not receiving justice entirely negative. Paradoxically, our P-E fit theorizing and results demonstrate that situations exist where high levels of justice enactment are no better than low levels of justice enactment. Specifically, when justice is valued at lower levels, outcomes are no different between high and low levels of justice received. Similarly, our results also reveal that not all situations of low justice received are equivalent. That is, holding low levels of justice received constant, treatment discrepancy was higher on days when employees valued justice at higher rather than lower levels.

Our Study 2 also revealed differences between forms of justice discrepancy (excess and deficiency) in cognitive and affective responses to justice enactment. More specifically, we find that cases of excess justice enactment lead to an increase in rumination, whereas cases of deficient justice enactment lead to a decrease in positive affect. Increases in rumination and decreases in positive affect were also related to decreased task proficiency and increased retaliatory behavior, similar to Study 1. Overall, although we certainly are not advocating for supervisors to provide low levels of justice to employees, we do advocate for a more nuanced approach to enacting justice toward employees. As our results show, reactions to justice are not solely driven by level; instead, it is the congruence of one’s daily value on situated justice with justice received that has the most impact, and these values and supplies greatly fluctuate on a day-to-day basis. Although exploratory, we also provide initial guidance on when employees may value justice at a high or low level on a given day. Specifically, we find that perceptions of control decrease the amount employees value justice, whereas previous instances of justice received increase the amount they value justice.

Although we know that justice is likely to vary in terms of both how much it is received (Johnson et al. 2014, Sherf et al. 2019) as well as how much it is valued (Wiesenfeld et al. 2007), scholars in the justice literature have overlooked the potential dynamic interplay between justice received and valued over time and thus have not developed strong theory regarding this interplay. Therefore, our first theoretical contribution lies in demonstrating and building theory arguing that successful implementation of justice enactment is not solely about absolute high levels. Instead, congruence across varying levels of value in the given moment play an equally (if not more) important role. By introducing the concept of temporal fluctuations in justice valued, we establish that, contrary to previous research, there is significant variability in how much employees value justice daily (i.e., 50.4% in Study 1 and 48.8% in Study 2). This idea builds off of prior work (Johnson et al. 2014, Sherf et al. 2019) that demonstrated daily variance in enacted justice and takes those conclusions a step further to build theory suggesting that recipients vary in their value of justice on a given day as well as that treatment discrepancies at that time cause either an increase in rumination or reduction in positive affect, which leads to negative work behaviors. We contribute to the justice literature by broadening our understanding of how justice enactment operates in the workplace and the pitfalls of providing justice under certain circumstances (i.e., when employees do not value justice at the time) and failing to provide justice in other circumstances (i.e., when employees do value justice at the time). We also answer calls made by Kristof-Brown et al. (2005) for future work to study P-E fit using more dynamic approaches.

The fact that one’s situated value on justice enactment varies on a day-to-day basis implies that there are times when enacting justice may be suboptimal. Therefore, we contribute by showing that mistimed justice enactment can be equally bad as cases in which supervisors do not adhere to justice at all. Thus, a nuanced approach to recommending justice enactment is necessary. There are trade-offs in terms of where supervisors invest their time and resources (Graen
and Scandura 1987, Graen and Uhl-Bien 1995), and the time and resources allocated to justice rule adherence are finite and potentially limited. Therefore, time spent allocating justice to an employee who does not value it leaves fewer resources for other employees who do value it. Indeed, recent research supports the idea that managers face trade-offs in terms of their daily activities, including justice enactment (Sherf et al. 2019). Therefore, by showing that not all instances in which supervisors provide high levels of justice are equivalent, we extend justice theory by revealing that supervisors who want to maximize their time and resources to improve employee productivity need to customize their justice interactions to better fit their employees’ values. However, counter to our expectations, helping behavior had inconsistent results across our two studies. Perhaps helping behavior is more habitual and less resource-demanding than task-focused behavior. Thus, although situations of excess justice may distract and consume employees’ attentional resources, helping behavior is less affected. It could also be that even while consuming resources, helping behavior builds resources as well (Steiger et al. 2008, Glomb et al. 2011).

Our third theoretical contribution lies in demonstrating the value of using P-E fit theory to understand the within-person fluctuation in the situated value of context- and time-bound justice. P-E fit theory and self-regulation-based accounts of P-E fit in particular (Edwards 1992, Johnson et al. 2013) focus on the nature and impact of discrepancies and, therefore, provide a mechanism — treatment discrepancy — that explains why employees react negatively to feeling like a different treatment would, should, and could have occurred. Therefore, our use of such theory paints a more complete picture of both the nature of the discrepancies between justice received and justice valued and also the process through which these discrepancies impact downstream behavior.

Our final theoretical contribution is identifying the specific mechanisms through which excess and deficient justice criteria enactment impact behavioral outcomes. Although having both an excess of justice enactment and a deficiency of justice enactment result in increased retaliatory behavior and decreased task proficiency (though to differing magnitudes), the mechanisms that mediate these relationships are distinct. We find that receiving justice in excess increased rumination, which mediates the relationship with retaliatory behavior and task proficiency. In contrast, receiving a deficient level of justice decreased positive affect, which mediates the relationship with retaliatory behavior and task proficiency. These unique cognitive and affective mechanisms are indicative of the dual reflective and reflexive systems, respectively, that guide information processing and ultimately behavior (Smith and DeCoste 2000, Strack and Deutsch 2004). In this way, our article speaks to recent calls to consider justice enactment through an information-processing lens (Barclay et al. 2017, Koopman et al. 2019).

Practically, we show that supervisors should not assume that employees always value justice. Supervisors must instead be attuned to employee values and act accordingly. For example, a supervisor might simply ask the employee whether this is a good time to discuss an issue or procedure or whether they have interest in a particular decision. For example, research has shown that supervisors who are more empathetic toward their employees are better at identifying employee values and also more responsive toward their employees (Cornelis et al. 2013). For employees, receiving justice at deficient or excess levels may signal that their supervisor does not understand them or care about their wishes. Thus, if supervisors make clear that they see employee individuality, this may ameliorate the effects of treatment discrepancy.

Even if a supervisor does not explicitly ask employees what they value, they might infer values based on environmental clues. If an employee is under strict work deadlines, that employee may be less likely to have a strong situated value for justice enactment at that moment. Beyond the actions of supervisors, employees can also take it upon themselves to ensure that their values for situated justice are met. They can do this by being more aware of when and why they value justice from a supervisor and by understanding what actions they can take to have their values met rather than ruminating about how things could have been different. For example, proactive employees who seek feedback and/or who perceive more control would experience fewer discrepancies.

Additionally, our mechanisms suggest that even when managers have little control over enacted justice or employees’ situated value for justice, steps can still be taken to limit the negative impact of excess or deficient justice enactment (justice discrepancy). For example, both reducing rumination (e.g., mindfulness exercises, see Deyo et al. 2009, Raes and Williams 2010) and increasing positive affect (e.g., charismatic leadership; see Erez et al. 2008) are methods that could help mitigate the negative effects of justice discrepancy. Therefore, our results encourage managers to use these cognitive and affective levers to limit the negative impact of justice discrepancy.

Limitations

Although our methodology and analyses have several strengths (e.g., sampling multiple times per day, predicting time-lagged outcomes, use of polynomial regression and overall treatment discrepancies in one study, teasing apart excess and deficiency and the different mechanisms that flow from these discrepancies
in the other), there are some limitations. One potential limitation is that all study variables were collected from the same source. However, the focal employee is the most appropriate source for evaluating justice received, justice valued, treatment discrepancy, positive affect, and rumination because these constructs are unique to employees’ perceptions (Gabriel et al. 2019). Collecting all data from employees also gives rise to the concern of common method variance. Therefore, we took several steps to reduce this concern. First, we group-mean centered our predictor variables, which minimizes response tendencies as a source of common method variance. Additionally, response tendencies are generally a between-person issue, and thus our within-person analyses effectively eliminated this as a possible confound. Second, we made sure that the measures of our focal variables were separated across time. Specifically, in Study 1, justice valued was measured at the midpoint of the day (midday), justice received and treatment discrepancy were measured at the end of that same workday (end-day), and the outcomes were measured at the end of the following day (next-day). In Study 2, justice discrepancies (excess and deficiency) were measured at the middle of the workday (midday) and the cognitive and affective responses to justice as well as the behavioral outcomes at the end of the work day (end-day). This type of temporal separation is especially effective for minimizing common method variance (Johnson et al. 2011). Third, following best practices (Beal 2015), we controlled for lagged downstream outcomes, which allowed us to examine change in the level of these variables from prior assessments (Johnson et al. 2014) and provided more compelling evidence for the presumed causal direction of effects (Beal 2015).

A second possible limitation is that we considered only justice received from supervisors. Although supervisors are a key source of justice criteria enactment, justice originates from other sources as well (companies, coworkers, customers, etc., Lavelle et al. 2007), and these other sources could be responsible for justice received-valued discrepancies. Thus, it would be useful to evaluate the multiple ways that employees’ situated value for justice can be met. However, because this is the first investigation of the fit between justice received and justice valued, we focused our attention on the most salient source of justice enactment for most employees. Supervisors are a primary source of justice information in the work environment because their role inherently involves making decisions about employee outcomes, procedures, and access to information. Additionally, the leadership literature has established the importance of perceptual and behavioral congruence between employees and supervisors (Engle and Lord 1997, Zhang et al. 2012, Matta et al. 2015). Although evaluating multiple sources of received justice is a fruitful direction for future research, we believe that examining whether employees’ situated value for justice is fulfilled by their supervisors is a sensible first step for understanding justice through a P-E fit lens.

**Future Directions**

Some interesting future directions stem from our study. Researchers can further examine how supervisors shape employees’ value on justice, as this is key to making sure that values are being met at appropriate levels. It is important to examine because if a supervisor cannot determine when justice enactment would have optimal impact, it is impossible for them to efficiently allocate their limited resources across time and employees. Our initial supplemental evidence suggests that prior justice enactment may play an important role in increasing employees’ value of justice in the future. Nonetheless, a lot more work needs to be done here. It may be that some supervisors are better than others at recognizing their employees’ level of justice valued. For example, supervisors who are high in perspective taking, social monitoring, and emotional intelligence may be better able to match their justice enactment to the values of others. Similarly, certain employees may be better able to express and communicate their level of justice valued, such as those who are high in proactivity and extroversion. Moreover, supervisors and employees who enjoy a high level of leader-member exchange may be able to more accurately identify and communicate their value for justice. Future research that identifies how supervisors can better understand the values of their employees and that identifies boundary conditions on employees’ ability to express their values would be useful.

Another future research direction would be to investigate what causes daily within-person fluctuations in justice value and between-person differences in how much these values vary. Although we have proposed some of the antecedents to valuing justice, future work is needed to explore these antecedents further. On the one hand, values could fluctuate on a particular day because of personal factors such as mood, lack of sleep, depletion, or the accessibility of control, belonging, or positive self-regard motives in working memory. For example, in our supplementary analysis, we found that perceptions of control negatively predicted future justice valued. On the other hand, an employee’s values could fluctuate based on situational factors such as the task at hand, changes in management or turnover of one’s supervisor, or interest in a particular justice outcome, process, or piece of information. For example, in our supplementary analysis, we also found that previous levels of justice received positively predicted future justice valued. Moving forward, it will be useful to identify person-
and situation-based factors that are responsible for these daily fluctuations. The extent to which daily value for justice fluctuates may also be a meaningful individual difference variable (possibly reflecting differences in the strength of people’s higher-order fundamental need for justice). Following that question to its logical conclusion, what might be some consequences of this individual difference? Is treatment discrepancy worse when there is high variance in justice valued between employees? Does this increase treatment discrepancy?

Another future research direction would be to examine the effect of other sources of justice enactment on an employee’s value for justice and treatment discrepancy. As we mention in our limitations, we examine only supervisor-provided justice in this article. However, recent research has demonstrated that observers of justice decisions can react in a positive way toward unjust decisions, and “the influence of social emotions on subjective justice judgments drive third party reactions” (Blader, 2013, p. 62). Skarlicki and Kulik (2005) also discuss the value of third parties in potentially punishing the transgressor and helping the victim, and Christian et al. (2012) found that team members can collectively retaliate if they feel that their supervisor has been unjust. Recent research has also found that justice social comparisons (the justice that their coworkers receive compared with their own) drive envy responses (and downstream behavioral responses) above and beyond absolute levels of justice (Koopman et al., 2020a). Future research should examine whether witnessing others receive (or not receive) justice affects treatment discrepancies. Additionally, perhaps receiving justice treatment from coworkers or customers can substitute for the justice enacted an individual wishes he or she had received from a supervisor.

Justice also plays a pivotal role in shaping self-construals and the extent to which employees identify with other people and groups (Tyler and Blader, 2000, Lind, 2001, Tyler and Blader, 2003, Johnson and Lord, 2010). Although we see this as potentially relevant to our phenomenon, we focused our Study 2 on rumination and positive affect, mechanisms relevant to P-E fit (our overarching theoretical perspective) as well as to justice (our phenomenon of interest). However, there are potentially several ways in which self-construals and psychological identification may shape and be shaped by the situated value of justice enactment and how employees interpret justice received. For example, the situated value of justice may be stronger (weaker) when goals and knowledge associated with an independent (interpersonal) justice criteria enactment. Thus, future research could further explore how self-construals and psychological identification could influence the situated value of justice enactment.

A final future direction would be to examine these processes in the context of injustice rather than justice. Although we examined whether an employee receives a high or low level of justice and its congruence with the justice level they valued, would the same effects hold when examining injustice? In other words, would we find the same benefits of congruence over absolute level when examining how much injustice someone received? Additionally, would we find that the situated value of injustice has a similar context- and time-varying nature?

**Conclusion**

Through our investigation of daily fluctuations in situated values of justice enactment using P-E fit theory, we illustrate that the degree of congruence between daily justice received and justice valued leads to decreased treatment discrepancy, which mediates relationships of justice congruence with task proficiency and retaliatory behavior. We also further teased apart cases of justice discrepancy to find that excess and deficit justice had different mechanisms connecting them to daily outcomes (reduced task proficiency and increased retaliatory behavior). More specifically, we found that cases of excess justice lead to cognitive responses (increased rumination), whereas cases of deficit justice lead to an affective response (reduced positive affect). This indicates not only that the value for justice enactment fluctuate daily within individuals but also that not all instances in which supervisors provide high levels of justice are equivalent. Based on this fit perspective, we suggest that an incomplete picture is painted when only the level of justice received is considered and the context- and time-varying values of employees are overlooked, which unfortunately is common practice in the justice literature. Based on our results, supervisors should make a pointed effort to tailor their justice interactions to employees’ values, because enacting too much justice can at times be just as bad as providing none at all.

**Appendix**

**Study 1 Measures**

**Justice Received — Atomistic Items**

**Overall Justice**

So far today, my supervisor ...
- ... acted fairly.
- ... did things that were fair.
- ... behaved like a fair person would.

**Procedural Justice**

So far today, my supervisor ...
• ... gave me the opportunity to express my views and feelings about a work decision or action.
• ... gave me the opportunity to exert influence over a work decision or action.
• ... gave me the opportunity to appeal a work decision or action.

**Interpersonal Justice**
So far today, my supervisor ...
• ... treated me in a polite manner.
• ... treated me with respect.
• ... treated me with dignity.

**Informational Justice**
So far today, my supervisor ...
• ... was candid in communications with me.
• ... was thorough when explaining procedures to me.
• ... was timely when communicating details to me.

**Justice Valued — Atomistic Items**

**Overall Justice**
So far today, it was important to me that my supervisor...
• ... acted fairly.
• ... did things that were fair.
• ... behaved like a fair person would.

**Procedural Justice**
So far today, it was important to me that my supervisor...
• ... provided me the opportunity to express my views and feelings about a work decision or action.
• ... provided me the opportunity to exert influence over a work decision or action.
• ... provided me the opportunity to appeal a work decision or action.

**Interpersonal Justice**
So far today, it was important to me that my supervisor...
• ... treated me in a polite manner.
• ... treated me with respect.
• ... treated me with dignity.

**Informational Justice**
So far today, it was important to me that my supervisor...
• ... was candid in communications with me.
• ... was thorough when explaining procedures to me.
• ... was timely when communicating details to me.

**Treatment Discrepancy**
So far today, ...
• ... I would have preferred it if my supervisor had treated me differently from how he/she actually did.
• ... I believe my supervisor could have treated me differently from how he/she actually did.
• ... I believe my supervisor should have treated me differently from how he/she actually did.

**Task Proficiency**
Today, ...
• ...I carried out the core parts of my job well.
• ...I completed my core tasks well using the standard procedures.
• ...I ensured my tasks were completed properly.

**Personal Helping**
Today, ...
• ...I took time to listen to a coworker’s problems and worries.
• ...I took a personal interest in a coworker.
• ...I showed concern and courtesy toward a coworker.

**Retaliatory Behavior**
Today, ...
• ...I used company resources for my own personal use.
• ...I took extra personal time (i.e., long break or lunch).
• ...I took longer than necessary to complete a task.
• ...I did not report another person's violation of company rules or policies.
• ...I concealed my own errors.
• ...I passed blame for errors to an innocent coworker.

**Sleep Quality**
• How would you evaluate the quality of your sleep last night?

**Sleep Quantity**
• Approximately how much sleep did you get last night?

**Depletion**
Right now, ...
• ...I feel drained.
• ...my mind feels unfocused.
• ...it would take a lot of effort for me to concentrate on something.
• ...my mental energy is running low.
• ...I feel like my willpower is done.

**Negative Affect**
Right now, I feel ...
• afraid.
• upset.
• nervous.
• scared.
• distressed.

**Positive Affect**
Right now, I feel ...
• inspired.
• alert.
• excited.
• enthusiastic.
• determined.

**Need Satisfaction**
So far today, ...
• ...I have felt that the people I work with are close friends.
• ...I have felt like part of a group among the people I work with.
• ...I have felt that I can talk to people I work with about things that really matter to me.
• ...I have felt competent at my job.
• ...I have felt that I am good at the things I do in my job.
• ...I have felt that I can accomplish difficult tasks at work.
• ...I have felt that I can be myself at my job.
• ...I have felt free to do my job the way I think it could be done best.
• ...the tasks that I have done are in line with what I really want to do.

• ...I have felt that the people I work with are close friends.
• ...I have felt like part of a group among the people I work with.
• ...I have felt that I can talk to people I work with about things that really matter to me.
• ...I have felt competent at my job.
• ...I have felt that I am good at the things I do in my job.
• ...I have felt that I can accomplish difficult tasks at work.
• ...I have felt that I can be myself at my job.
• ...I have felt free to do my job the way I think it could be done best.
• ...the tasks that I have done are in line with what I really want to do.
Uncertainty
Today ...
• ... there was a lot of uncertainty at work.
• ... I could not predict how things would go at work.
• ... I felt a lot of uncertainty at work.
• ... many things seemed unsettled at work.

Stress
Today ...
• ... I felt a great deal of stress because of my job.
• ... my job was extremely stressful.
• ... very few stressful things happened to me at work.
• ... I almost never felt stressed at work.

Task Helping
Today, ...
• ... I took on extra responsibilities in order to help a coworker when things got demanding at work.
• ... I helped a coworker with a difficult assignment, even if the assistance was not directly requested.
• ... I assisted a coworker with a heavy workload, even though it was not a part of my job.

Trust
Today ...
• ... I had complete trust in my supervisor.
• ... I did not believe what my supervisor said.
• ... I found it difficult to trust my supervisor.

Ethical Leadership
Today ...
• ... my supervisor set an example of how to do things the right way in terms of ethics.
• ... my supervisor asked “what is the right thing to do?” when making decisions.
• ... my supervisor disciplined employees who violated ethical standards.

Moral Identity
Listed below are some characteristics that might describe a person:
Caring, Compassionate, Fair, Friendly, Generous, Helpful, Hardworking, Honest, Kind
Please visualize in your mind the kind of person who has these characteristics. The person with these characteristics could be you, or it could be someone else. Imagine how that person would think, feel, and act.
Today, ...
• ... it would make me feel good to be a person who has these characteristics.
• ... being someone who has these characteristics is an important part of who I am.
• ... I strongly desire to have these characteristics.

Intrinsic Motivation
For the past week, ...
• ... I have felt that my job is meaningful.
• ... I have felt that the tasks I do at work are enjoyable.
• ... I have felt that my job is very exciting.

Extrinsic Motivation
For the past week, ...
• ... it has been important for me to have an external incentive to strive for in order to do a good job.
• ... if I had been offered better pay, I would have done a better job.
• ... if I was supposed to put in extra effort in my job, I would have needed to get extra pay.

Job Satisfaction
For the past week, ...
• ... I was enthusiastic about my work.
• ... I felt fairly satisfied with my job.
• ... I found real enjoyment in my work.

Goal Commitment
For the past week, ...
• ... I have been strongly committed to pursuing my work goals.
• ... I have taken my work goals seriously.
• ... I have been committed to my work goals.

Affective Commitment
For the past week, ...
• ... I have really felt as if this organization’s problems were my own.
• ... I have felt “emotionally attached” to this organization.
• ... this organization has had a great deal of personal meaning for me.

OBSE
For the past week, ...
• ... I have been helpful at work.
• ... I have been able to make a difference at work.
• ... I have been a valuable employee at work.

Study 2 Measures
Justice — Molecular Items

Procedural Justice
Compared with how much I wanted it, my supervisor ...
• ... gave me opportunities to express my views and feelings about a work decision or action.
• ... gave me opportunities to exert influence over a work decision or action.
• ... gave me opportunities to appeal a work decision or action.

Interpersonal Justice
Compared with how much I wanted it, my supervisor ...
• ... treated me in a polite manner.
• ... treated me with respect.
• ... treated me with dignity.

Informational Justice
Compared with how much I wanted it, my supervisor ...
• ... was candid in communications with me
• ... was thorough when explaining procedures to me
• ... was timely when communicating details to me

Overall Justice
Compared with how much I wanted it, my supervisor ...
• ... acted fairly.
• ... did things that were fair.
• ... exhibited behaviors that were fair.
**Justice Received — Atomistic Items**

**Procedural Justice**
Since taking the previous survey today, my supervisor...
  - ... gave me the opportunity to express my views and feelings about a work decision or action.
  - ... gave me the opportunity to exert influence over a work decision or action.
  - ... gave me the opportunity to appeal a work decision or action.

**Distributive Justice**
Since taking the previous survey today, my supervisor...
  - ... distributed outcomes based on the effort I have put into my work.
  - ... distributed outcomes based on the work I have completed.
  - ... distributed outcomes that are appropriate based on the work I have completed.

**Interpersonal Justice**
Since taking the previous survey today, my supervisor...
  - ... treated me in a polite manner.
  - ... treated me with respect.
  - ... treated me with dignity.

**Informational Justice**
Since taking the previous survey today, my supervisor...
  - ... was candid in communications with me.
  - ... was thorough when explaining procedures to me.
  - ... was timely when communicating details to me.

**Overall Justice**
Since taking the previous survey today, my supervisor...
  - ... acted fairly toward me.
  - ... behaved like a fair person would toward me.
  - ... did things that are fair toward me.

---

**Justice Valued — Atomistic Items**

**Procedural Justice**
So far today, it is important to me that my supervisor...
  - ... provides me with the opportunity to express my views and feelings about a work decision or action.
  - ... provides me with the opportunity to exert influence over a work decision or action.
  - ... provides me with the opportunity to appeal a work decision or action.

**Distributive Justice**
So far today, it is important to me that my supervisor...
  - ... distributes outcomes based on the effort I have put into my work.
  - ... distributes outcomes based on the work I have completed.
  - ... distributes outcomes that are appropriate based on the work I have completed.

**Interpersonal Justice**
So far today, it is important to me that my supervisor...
  - ... is polite toward me.
  - ... is respectful toward me.
  - ... treats me with dignity.

**Informational Justice**
So far today, it is important to me that my supervisor...
  - ... is candid in communications with me.
  - ... is thorough when explaining procedures to me.
  - ... is timely when communicating details to me.

**Personal Helping**
Today, ...
  - ... I took time to listen to a coworker’s problems and worries.
  - ... I took a personal interest in a coworker.
  - ... I showed concern and courtesy toward a coworker.

---

**Overall Justice**
So far today, it was important to me that my supervisor...
  - ... acted fairly toward me.
  - ... behaved like a fair person would toward me.
  - ... did things that are fair toward me.

**Treatment Discrepancy**
Since taking the previous survey today, ... 
  - ... I would have preferred it if my supervisor had treated me differently from how he/she actually did.
  - ... I believed my supervisor could have treated me differently from how he/she actually did.

**Rumination**
Since taking the previous survey today, ...
  - ... thoughts and feelings about my supervisor’s actions toward me kept running through my head.

**Interruptions**
At some points today ...
  - ... my supervisor disturbed me from doing my work.
  - ... my supervisor kept me from doing my job.

**Positive Affect**
Right now, I feel ...
  - ... inspired.
  - ... alert.
  - ... excited.
  - ... enthusiastic.
  - ... determined.

**Negative Affect**
Right now, I feel ...
  - ... afraid.
  - ... upset.
  - ... nervous.
  - ... scared.
  - ... distressed.

**Task Proficiency**
Today, ...
  - ... I completed the core parts of my job well.
  - ... I completed my core tasks well using the standard procedures.
  - ... I ensured my tasks were completed properly.

---
Task Helping
Today, …
• … I took on extra responsibilities in order to help a coworker when things got demanding at work.
• … I helped a coworker with a difficult assignment, even if the assistance was not directly requested.
• … I assisted a coworker with a heavy workload, even though it was not a part of my job.

Retaliatory Behavior
Today, …
• … I used company resources for my own personal use.
• … I took extra personal time (i.e., long break or lunch).
• … I took longer than necessary to complete a task.
• … I did not report another person’s violation of company rules or policies.
• … I concealed my own errors.
• … I passed blame for errors to an innocent coworker.

Sleep Quality
• How would you evaluate the quality of your sleep last night?

Sleep Quantity
• Approximately how much sleep did you get last night?

Pride
Right now, …
• … I would feel good if I was described as a typical member of my organization.
• … I am proud to tell my friends that I belong to my organization.
• … I often talk about my organization as a great group.

Respect
Right now, …
• … I believe I have a good reputation in my organization.
• … most members of my organization respect me.
• … other members appreciate the work I do.

Depletion
Right now, …
• … I feel drained.
• … my mind feels unfocused.
• … it would take a lot of effort for me to concentrate on something.
• … my mental energy is running low.

Stress
Right now, …
• … I feel a great deal of stress because of my job.
• … my job is extremely stressful.
• … I feel stressed at work.

Uncertainty
Right now, …
• … there is a lot of uncertainty at work.
• … I cannot predict how things will go at work.
• … I feel a lot of uncertainty at work.

Untrustworthiness of Supervisor
Right now, …
• … I am uncertain about whether my supervisor is trustworthy.
• … If I think about my supervisor’s trustworthiness, I feel a lot of uncertainty.
• … I cannot predict if my supervisor will behave in a trustworthy way at work.

Morality of Supervisor
Right now, …
• … I am uncertain about whether my supervisor is moral.
• … If I think about my supervisor’s morality, I feel a lot of uncertainty.
• … I cannot predict if my supervisor will behave in a moral way at work.

Uncertainty of Social Status
Right now, …
• … I am uncertain about my social status at work.
• … if I think about my social status at work, I feel a lot of uncertainty.
• … I cannot predict what my social status at work will be.

Uncertainty of Goal Progress
Right now, …
• … I am uncertain about my progress on work goals.
• … if I think about my goal progress at work, I feel a lot of uncertainty.
• … I cannot predict the progress I will make toward my work goals.

Control
Thinking about today …
• … I feel I have little control over things that happen to me.
• … I feel I cannot seem to solve all of my problems.
• … I feel there is not much that I can do to change things at work.

Self-Esteem Concerns
Right now, …
• … I question whether I have any good qualities.
• … I question whether I can do things as well as most other people.
• … I feel dissatisfied with myself.

Supervisor Ability
Right now, …
• … I feel that my supervisor is very capable of performing his/her job.
• … I feel that my supervisor has much knowledge about the work that needs to be done.
• … I feel very confident about my supervisor’s skills.

Supervisor Benevolence
Right now, …
• … I feel that my supervisor is very concerned about my welfare.
• … I feel that my supervisor really looks out for what is important to me.
• … I feel that my supervisor would go out of his/her way to help me.
Supervisor Integrity
Right now, …
• … I feel that my supervisor has a strong sense of justice.
• … I feel that my supervisor tries hard to be fair in dealing with others.
• … I feel that my supervisor’s actions and behaviors are consistent.

Social Exchange
My relationship with my supervisor/organization is characterized by
• mutual obligation.
• mutual trust.
• mutual commitment.
• mutual significance.

Group Identity
Since taking the previous survey today, …
• … if someone had criticized my workgroup, it would have felt like a personal insult.
• … I was very interested in what others thought of my workgroup.
• … if someone had praised my workgroup, it would have felt like a personal compliment.

Goal Progress
Since taking the previous survey today, …
• … I made good progress on my work goals.
• … I had a productive day today in relation to my work goals.
• … I moved forward with my work goals today.

Endnotes
1 When examining P-E fit from a values perspective, research “conceptualizes values as the importance of an attribute” (Cable and Edwards 2004). Indeed, previous research has measured “importance” in an atomistic approach and used it to represent “values” (Cable and Edwards, 2004, Edwards and Cable 2009).
2 Although the justice literature also examines the role of negative affect as a linking mechanism, it has been shown to be associated with increased injustice (Skarlicki and Folger 1997, Barclay et al. 2005, Cohen-Charash and Byrne 2008, Colquitt et al. 2013). Given the distinction between justice and injustice articulated by Colquitt et al. (2015), we focus on positive affect.

References


Anna C. Lennard is an assistant professor of management at the Spears School of Business at Oklahoma State University. She received her PhD from Michigan State University. Her research interests include affect, organizational justice, and decision making.

Fadel K. Matta is an associate professor and the Terry Dean’s Advisory Council Distinguished Professor in the Department of Management at the University of Georgia’s Terry College of Business. He received his PhD from Michigan State University. His research focuses on organizational justice, leader-member exchange, and emotions in the workplace.

Szu-Han (Joanna) Lin is an assistant professor of management in the Terry College of Business at the University of Georgia. She received her PhD in Organizational Behavior and Human Resource Management from Michigan State University. Her research interests include self-regulation, leadership, organizational citizenship behavior, and personality.

Joel Koopman is an associate professor of management in the Mays Business School at Texas A&M University. He earned his PhD from Michigan State University. His research interests include organizational justice, citizenship behavior, daily employee self-regulation and well-being, and research methodology.

Russell Johnson is an associate professor of management in the Broad College of Business at Michigan State University. He earned his PhD from the University of Akron. His research interests include motivation, justice, and work attitudes.