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What Does It Cost You to Get There? The Effects of Emotional Journeys on Daily Outcomes

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Scholarly understanding of emotions and emotion regulation rests on two incompatible truths—that positive emotions are positively beneficial and should be pursued, and that changing emotions may come at a cost. With both perspectives in mind, to really conclude that pursuing higher positive affect (PA) is a worthy journey, we must take into account the cost of that journey itself. We build from the affect shift literature and draw on self-regulation theories to argue that, although end-states characterized by more positive (and fewer negative) emotions will be beneficial, the emotional changes required to "get there" will have consequences for employee regulatory resources and subsequent behavior. In Study 1, we use experience sampling methodology to track employee *emotional journeys*—changes in emotions in terms of directionality (e.g., toward pleasure and away from pain) and distance (i.e., magnitude of change in terms of intensity changes within-emotions as well as magnitude of change in activation/valence level between emotions)—that capture the amount of emotion regulation preceding emotion end-states. Teasing apart variance attributable to the end-state versus the journey, we demonstrate that steeper daily PA trajectories (steeper increases in intensity of positive, activated emotions) and valence trajectories (steeper movement away from more negative emotions toward more positive emotions) lead to psychological depletion, ultimately triggering interpersonal counterproductive work behaviors and harming citizenship and performance. In Study 2, we test our core propositions in a lab experiment, demonstrating that different emotional journeys "leading up" to the same affective end-state can change the meaning of that end-state.

Keywords: affect, emotion regulation, affect shift, depletion, experience sampling methodology

As far back as the 1700s, humans were focused on pursuing happiness (Jefferson, 1776). Today, conventional wisdom, a $10 billion "self-care" industry, and entire literatures built on the premise that positive emotions generate positive outcomes are but three of countless indicators that feeling good (and feeling less bad) is *the* goal. For example, a range of theoretical perspectives have highlighted the benefits and desirability of genuine positive emotions at work (e.g., Fredrickson, 1998, 2001; Lazarus, 1993; Quinn et al., 2012; Weiss & Cropanzano, 1996). Unsurprisingly, then, empirical studies too have consistently linked positive emotional states to increased satisfaction, commitment, motivation, and performance, among others (e.g., Colquitt et al., 2013; Koopman et al., 2016; Lee et al., 2018; Todorova et al., 2014). In fact, positive organizational scholarship has developed exclusively with the aim of studying how to build positive emotions and create positive energy in employees (Cameron et al., 2003), and nascent work on affect shift—a literature focused on shifts in positive and negative affect (PA and NA) throughout one's day—has suggested that increasing PA (whether accompanied by a decrease or an increase of NA) is optimal for numerous workplace outcomes (Bledow et al., 2011, 2013; Yang et al., 2016). Research today aligns with views dating back to the 1700s: Positive emotions are to be pursued.

Despite the mounting evidence, this literature has developed somewhat at odds with the emotion regulation literature, in that it implicitly assumes the act of increasing PA (to produce high PA) is a benefit, a resource, and something to aspire to. Meanwhile, insights from the emotion regulation literature warn that there may be costs to doing so when these PA increases are intentional (Gross, 1998)—and perhaps even when not (Baumeister & Vohs, 2016). Indeed, scholars have stressed the psychological toll of overriding one emotion state in favor of another (e.g., Grandey & Gabriel, 2015; Gross, 2008; Scott, Awasty, et al., 2020). As such, our understanding of emotions and emotion regulation rest on two incompatible truths—positive emotions are positively beneficial and should be pursued, and changing emotions comes at a cost.

We suggest that these perspectives can be reconciled by theoretically and empirically changing the way we conceptualize state affect. Nearly all affect research has taken emotional states at face value—theorizing and capturing the benefits (or consequences) of that state, but overlooking what was involved in "arriving there." Accordingly, our understanding of affective states rests on the flawed assumption that momentary emotions of equal intensity, valence, or activation are created equal. For example, prior work would theoretically and empirically treat three individuals with PA

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at "Level 4" as essentially the same. However, we argue that a state of positive, activated emotions at Level 4 has different meanings depending on how the individual affectively "traveled" to get there. Consider an employee who began with PA at Level 1, rose to Level 5, and ended at Level 4 (indicating severe increasing intensity of high activation, positive emotions) versus one who began and remained at Level 4 (indicating steady high activation, positive emotions and a slope of 0) versus one who began at Level 5, dipped to Level 3, and ended at Level 4 (indicating a modest decrease in intensity of high activation, positive emotions). Alternatively, consider an employee who began the day feeling mainly negative emotions, moved to feeling neutral, and ended the day feeling predominantly positive versus one who, for instance, started, remained, and ended predominantly positive. Each of these combinations implies a different "build up" or journey, and each journey, we argue, should change the meaning of the end-state. In other words, to really conclude that pursuing higher PA is a worthy journey, we need to take into account the potential cost of that journey itself. Unfortunately, as it stands, answers to why and how this process unfolds and shapes end-states cannot be extrapolated from existing work.

With this in mind, the purpose of this article is to integrate insight from the emotion regulation literature to build new theory for emotional experiences more broadly. Specifically, we use budding research on affect shifts (Bledow et al., 2011, 2013; Yang et al., 2016) to serve as a starting point. We advance theory by delineating *emotion end-states* (i.e., state affect at some time point) from *emotional journeys*—changes in emotions in terms of directionality (e.g., toward pleasure and away from pain) and distance (i.e., magnitude of change in terms of intensity changes within-emotions as well as magnitude of change in activation/valence level between emotions) that capture the amount of emotion regulation leading up to end-states (Scott, Awasty, et al., 2020). To uncover buried regulation costs that may come with achieving positive emotions (or avoiding negative ones), we go beyond the status quo of considering advantages brought by various positive and negative emotional states in isolation, to theoretically and empirically consider the emotional journey undertaken to arrive there.

To facilitate comparison of our work to the affect shift and the broader affect literature, we first examine *PA and NA trajectories*—emotional journeys characterized by changes in the intensity (strength) of high activation, positive and negative emotions specifically. We then consider the full range of emotions (all valence and activation levels; Larsen & Diener, 1992) and track changes between different affect states to capture the *valence trajectories*—emotional journeys characterized by changes across negative and positive emotions—and *activation trajectories*—emotional journeys characterized by changes in activation level of emotions—that precede end-states. We draw from resource models of self-regulation as an overarching framework to build and test theory for opposing effects of emotional end-states (e.g., state PA/NA) and emotional journeys (e.g., PA/NA trajectories) on psychological resources. In line with the general consensus that positive emotions are advantageous, we argue that hedonic (i.e., more positive and less negative) end-states will decrease resource depletion. However, in line with emotion regulation perspectives, we also argue that the very same end-states may result from different emotional journeys "traveled" toward positive emotions (or away from negative emotions), and stronger journeys in these directions will increase resource depletion.

In view of our proposals that emotional journeys toward hedonic goals deplete psychological resources, our self-regulatory perspective reveals the potential for darker behavioral outcomes flowing from this depletion. Thus, to demonstrate the organizational importance of emotional journeys and their proximal effects on depletion, we also consider their downstream impact on performance (task performance, citizenship, and counterproductive behavior). In line with the relevance of trait neuroticism to self-regulation theories as well as to both the affect and depletion literatures, we also theorize that this personality trait exacerbates the depleting effects of longer emotional journeys toward hedonic goals. Finally, given that this is the first empirical examination of the emotional journey concept, we examine a range of moderators relevant to self-regulatory processes in an exploratory fashion to spur future research.

Our work makes key theoretical, practical, and empirical contributions. Theoretically, we draw on nascent insights from emotion regulation research to build from and advance the affect shift literature (specifically) and affect literature (broadly). Within a self-regulatory framework, we build theory for emotional journeys versus emotional end-states that allows us to (a) integrate and reconcile seemingly incompatible perspectives on positive emotions and (b) shift the broader affect literature's consensus that positive emotions are strictly a benefit to pursue. Moreover, we identify and challenge the flawed assumption that affective states can be understood without taking into account the emotional trajectory that produced them. We test (and largely support) our theory that emotional journeys alter the meaning of emotional end-states across both field and lab settings. Finally, we consider a host of moderators and practically relevant behavioral outcomes inspired by our theoretical framework. In doing so, we build an initial nomological network for the emotional journey concept and begin to identify individual differences and daily approaches to emotion regulation that amplify or neutralize its effects.

Empirically, we present the first operationalizations of emotional journeys (which capture the *amount* of emotion regulation that takes place). Paradoxically, this has been sorely lacking from past work, which has focused on *how* people go about regulating emotions rather than the amount of regulation that occurs (Scott, Awasty, et al., 2020). Moreover, we conceptualize and measure emotional journeys two ways—capturing both within-emotion changes in intensity (i.e., PA/NA trajectories) and between-emotion changes in valence and activation (i.e., valence/activation trajectories). Empirically and theoretically, moving beyond strictly high activation positive and negative emotions serves as a pivot for affect shift studies and the broader affect literature, both of which have often focused on/measured strictly high activation, positive and negative emotions even when theorizing about positive and negative emotions more generally.

Theory and Hypotheses

Affect Shifts and Emotional Journeys

Critical to our work, the affect shift literature has opened the door to considering "where employees come from" affectively—considering PA/NA levels at two points in time. For example, oft-evoked affect shift perspectives such as personality systems interaction theory and the dual-tuning perspective have explained how and why experiencing certain emotion(s) initially and certain emotion(s) subsequently may make different ways of thinking accessible and ultimately drive employee behaviors (e.g., Bledow et al., 2013; George, 2011; Kuhl, 2000). Aligned with the majority of the broader affect literature, then, affect shift research has consistently linked higher state PA (and "upshifts" in PA—lower followed by higher intensity of positive, activated emotions) to strictly beneficial outcomes, such as creativity, engagement, task performance, and citizenship behavior (OCB) (Bledow et al., 2011, 2013; Yang et al., 2016).

Recognizing that prior emotional "start points" precede any emotional experience serves as a crucial step for affect scholars; however, theory in this nascent stream still remains stuck on affective beginning- and end-states and the benefits/consequences (e.g., the thought-action and motivational implications) offered by each state. As such, the affect literature has yet to acknowledge what underlies the actual movement from one emotional experience to the next—the emotional "build up" (or dissolution) that leads up to any momentary emotion state. Accordingly, although the idea of change clearly lives just below the surface in affect shift logic, theory and empirics have yet to address and capture what is involved in actually executing that change—the act of chang*ing*.

Coupled with nascent insights from emotion regulation theories, we use the affect shift literature as a springboard from which to build theory for this act of changing. Utilizing the concept of *emotional journeys*—the joint interplay of distance and direction "traveled" from an affect start point to an affect end-state (Scott, Awasty, et al., 2020)—we contend that the same affect end-state may take on a different meaning depending on the journey that led up to it. Our theoretical and empirical approach allows for the decomposition of affect shifts and emotion experiences—breaking out each affect end-state from the underlying journey that produced it. In doing so, we theorize and test the unique effects of emotional journeys underlying affect shifts (e.g., PA/NA trajectories) and their accompanying emotional end-states.

Emotional Journeys as Regulation Toward Hedonic Goals

Emotion regulation occurs any time people influence the content, timing, experience, and/or expression of their emotions (Gross, 1998). Emotional distance and direction between a start point and end-state (i.e., emotional journeys) thus capture the amount of emotional regulation that has taken place (Scott, Awasty, et al., 2020). Indeed, although the form/methods of emotion regulation (e.g., surface acting vs. deep acting vs. genuine displays; antecedent- vs. response-focused strategies) capture *how* emotions are regulated, the emotional distance and direction capture the *extent* of regulation taking place.

Though the notion of emotional journeys was introduced in an emotional labor context specifically,[1] we extend the core idea to emotional experiences more broadly—which are all self-regulated in some way, be it "automatic or controlled, conscious or unconscious" (Gross, 1998, p. 275; see also Bargh & Williams, 2007; Kuppens et al., 2010; Mauss, Bunge, et al., 2007). That is, whether individuals are purposefully attempting to change their emotions (via controlled regulation), are embracing happenstance authentic emotions (and the accompanying automatic regulation), or are somewhere in between, emotional experiences imply that some form of regulation is taking place, and that regulation should have an "end goal." In general, we contend this "end goal" is to increase positive emotions and reduce negative emotions (Diener et al., 1999; Thoresen et al., 2003). Indeed, the notion that people innately and continuously seek heightened pleasure and reduced pain is consistent with the mood-as-input model (Martin et al., 1993), the hedonic contingency model (Wegener & Petty, 1994), and reviews of the emotion regulation literature which note that "emotion regulation goals are readily understood in hedonistic terms: People are motivated to avoid pain and seek pleasure" (Gross, 2008, p. 500).

To summarize, emotional experiences should be continuously regulated (consciously or unconsciously) toward hedonic goals, and emotional journeys capture this regulation (Scott, Awasty, et al., 2020). To truly interpret an emotional state, then, we must also consider the extent of regulation (or lack thereof) that produced it. As the discrepancy between hedonic states and the emotions that individuals are "coming from" widens, greater regulation is needed to close the gap. Critically, resource models of self-regulation speak to the toll of "closing the gap" between current state and a desired goal in terms of *depletion*—drained psychological resources needed to exert self-control—and shed light on the psychological resources provided by affective end-states (Baumeister & Vohs, 2003, 2007; Baumeister et al., 2007; Johnson et al., 2006; Muraven et al., 1998). With this in mind, we invoke self-regulation theories to develop a model that explains the countervailing effects of emotional journeys toward hedonic goals and their associated end-states on resource depletion and subsequent workplace outcomes.

Affective End-States as Resources

In line with affect shift work and the broader affect literature—both of which have underscored the benefits of high state PA (Barsade & Gibson, 2007; Bledow et al., 2011, 2013; Fredrickson, 2001; Yang et al., 2016)—we argue that affective end-states which meet hedonic goals (i.e., heightened positive emotions and stifled negative emotions) are likely to benefit psychological resources. First and foremost, to achieve these end-states is to "close the gap" between current state and the hedonic desired state—signaling goal attainment. This is critical from a resource perspective, as unmet goals continue to siphon off attention and regulatory resources (Masicampo & Baumeister, 2011). Thus, higher PA and lower NA end-states suggest that one's goals are fulfilled and should remove the resource burdens of an incomplete goal.

In addition, self-regulation theories suggest that PA may reduce depletion by increasing the resources available for self-control and acting as a "replenishing" experience (Johnson et al., 2017). That is, a state of high PA may combat or relieve some depletion of self-regulatory resources by serving as a regulatory resource or energy source in and of itself (Quinn et al., 2012). Indeed, scholars have theorized that positive emotions generate physical, intellectual, social, and psychological resources (Chi et al., 2015; Fredrickson, 1998, 2001). Accordingly, momentary positive emotions should

[1] Emotional labor represents a subset of emotion regulation wherein employees regulate via surface or deep acting to display emotions that they are expected to show as part of their job (for a review, see Grandey & Gabriel, 2015).

serve as "credits" added to the resource bank. A host of indirect evidence can be found for this effect. For example, scholars have linked high PA in depleted individuals to increased self-regulation capabilities, suggesting that PA serves as an alternative source of resources to replenish some of those lost (Tice et al., 2007). Likewise, Bono et al. (2013) tied daily state PA to decreased stress and lowered health problems, arguing that PA provides psychological resources to combat stress and poor well-being.

From this perspective, PA acts as a resource and should provide a direct supply of energy needed for self-regulatory tasks. Taken together, we argue that a higher state of PA signals temporary partial achievement of one's hedonic goals (relieving the drain of an unfulfilled goal) and provides momentary energy (resource generating). All else equal, then, end-states characterized by more positive emotions should have a negative relationship with depletion.

> *Hypothesis 1a:* Controlling for the linear change in PA, employees whose affective end-state is higher in PA will suffer less depletion.

Self-regulation theories also inform how state NA may increase depletion by draining psychological resources. Specifically, self-regulation theories contend that maintaining vigilance, distributing attention among tasks, and ignoring distractions all fall under the umbrella of acts that require overriding, inhibiting, or changing the self (Johnson et al., 2017). As such, they require the use of self-regulatory resources and ultimately trigger feelings of depletion (Muraven, 2012). Unlike positive emotions that inspire broadened thinking and attentional freedom, negative emotions are tied to narrowed, vigilant thinking patterns (Fredrickson, 1998; Lazarus, 1991). For example, when negative emotions arise as a result of undesirable stimuli, attention is redirected and deployed toward the negative feeling and its source (Pratto & John, 1991)—a phenomenon termed "automatic vigilance." Thus, as employees experience NA, they instinctually devote cognitive resources and attention to the stimuli responsible. In line with this idea, research has linked daily receipt of incivility to depletion, in part owing to resources consumed by the negative feelings that arise and efforts made to understand the undesirable stimuli (Rosen et al., 2016).

Clear overlap can be seen between sources of resource drain and the experience of negative emotions at work. First, heightened negative emotions stimulate vigilance—a state characterized by attentiveness and concern—which draws from psychological resources. Second, by definition, automatic vigilance forces employees to allocate additional attention—some goes toward their work task, and some goes toward their negative feeling source. Finally, it is likely that employees will attempt to ignore the negative feeling state and its source, trying to shift their full attention back toward their work task. To do so is to mentally block out a distraction. Given that all of these experiences (maintaining vigilance, monitoring attentional distribution across tasks, and overcoming distractions) drain self-regulatory resources (Johnson et al., 2017), we argue that state NA spurs depletion. Thus, employees whose affective end-state is *lower* in NA both attain their hedonic affective goals (eliminating the drain of a lingering goal) and pause the resource drain of negative emotions. In turn, they should suffer less depletion.

> *Hypothesis 1b:* Controlling for the linear change in NA, employees whose daily affective end-state is lower in NA will suffer less depletion.

> *Corollary to Hypothesis 1:* Controlling for linear change in valence, employees whose daily emotion end-state (across all emotional experiences) is more positively (and less negatively) valenced will suffer less depletion.

Emotional Journeys as Resource Drains

We have outlined that emotional journeys—composed of distance and direction which convey the extent of emotion regulation "leading up" to end-state affect (Scott, Awasty, et al., 2020)—occur via a blend of controlled emotion regulation and authentic emotions that arise naturally (and are automatically regulated; Mauss, Bunge, et al., 2007). Beginning with one end of the spectrum—strictly controlled emotion regulation—self-regulatory resource models explicitly argue that this process in general is depleting (Muraven, 2012). Indeed, emotion regulation is one of the oldest and most enduring examples that self-regulation theorists have offered as a drain on resources (Baumeister et al., 1998).

Intentionally and mindfully overriding emotional states toward hedonic goals requires a great deal of self-control, concentration, and mental energy. As such, significant psychological resources are exhausted when people deliberately alter their emotions toward desired end-states. This logic is supported by a host of studies in the self-regulation literature, wherein emotion regulation has demonstrated consistent taxing effects on individuals tasked with suppressing *or* exaggerating emotions (e.g., Muraven et al., 1998; Schmeichel et al., 2006). It follows that more severe emotional journeys toward hedonic goals (i.e., more severe increases in PA/decreases in NA or improvements in valence) are indicative of greater bouts of emotion regulation and, thus, should be more depleting. Indeed, in the context of conscious emotion regulation, greater regulatory resources are consumed as the distance between an emotional start and end point increase (Diefendorff & Gosserand, 2003; Scott, Awasty, et al., 2020).

Turning to the other end of the spectrum—authentic emotional experiences and the accompanying automatic regulation toward hedonic goals—far less is known about the resources required to "fuel" this automatic effort (Baumeister & Vohs, 2016; Fitzsimons & Bargh, 2004), as both theorizing and empirical examinations in this area have been conflicting and inconclusive (e.g, Fitzsimons & Bargh, 2004; Koole & Rothermund, 2011; Mauss, Cook, et al., 2007; Mauss et al., 2008). However, self-regulation theorists have speculated that when it comes to automatic self-regulation, "it may be specifically the inhibiting or overriding aspect of self-control, rather than its conscious, deliberate nature, that is depleting. What consumes energy, in other words, is blocking another response" (Baumeister & Vohs, 2016, p. 76). This logic is consistent with recent work demonstrating that automatic regulation in response to negative stimuli (i.e., automatically regulating to stifle negative emotions) depletes regulatory resources (Pu et al., 2010). Put simply—even though carried out subconsciously—if automatic regulation involves overriding or blocking "easier" courses of action (e.g., subconsciously blocking or dampening a negative emotional response to a negative event; subconsciously overriding the tendency to let positive emotions flatten or subside once the novelty of a positive event wears off), it should consume greater resources.

Given that overriding "easier" or more likely courses of action in pursuit of others is what consumes energy in automatic regulation, it follows that the most resource-consuming bouts will be those that regulate toward hedonic goals (relative to sustaining an emotion or moving away from hedonic goals) because this regulation runs counter to the prototypical "easy" or likely course. Indeed, although people prefer and strive for pleasure over pain (Diener et al., 1999; Gross, 1998; Larsen, 2000; Lennard et al., 2019), ironically, theories of emotion converge to suggest that pleasure is harder to attain and harder still to increase, while negative emotions are easier to incur. There are several reasons for this. For one, people are attuned to negative stimuli more than positive stimuli. For example, as noted in the dual-tuning perspective of emotions, humans have a "negativity bias" that affects both PA and NA (George, 2011). This negativity bias suggests that negative stimuli, information, and events are more potent than positive stimuli, information, and events (Cacioppo et al., 1999), and as such, we attend to them more (Vaish et al., 2008). Another reason is that the behavioral alternatives available to continually increase (or even maintain) positive emotions dwindle relative to those available to increase negative emotions. Indeed, as highlighted in the hedonic contingency model, "a person in a very happy mood has a more limited set of behavior alternatives that will lead to hedonic rewards. In fact, most available activities would make the person feel worse . . . will strip the person of the happy mood" (Wegener & Petty, 1994, p. 1035).

For these reasons, it is not surprising that Frijda's (1988) law of hedonic asymmetry contends that although negative emotions are easy to sustain or grow, to sustain—and especially to increase—positive emotions requires effort. Indeed, an employee's affective state is constantly bombarded by subjective appraisals of the environment, biological influences, effects of substances ingested, hormone levels, time of the day, outside events, climate, and physical activity, among other things, and they must continuously regulate emotions (controlled or automatically) to meet hedonic goals (Koole, 2009; Kuppens et al., 2010; Larsen, 2000). Although some of these factors may help facilitate the goal of positive emotions (e.g., finding out good news), many of them may threaten it. Moreover, when serendipitous events *do* contribute to the goal of positive emotions (e.g., finding out good news), individuals must further regulate (controlled or automatically) to savor that positive feeling (Frijda, 1988; Miyamoto & Ma, 2011). Thus, harnessing and increasing positive emotions (Frijda, 1988)—and preventing negative emotions from "creeping in" (Cacioppo et al., 1999)—should be more difficult than the reverse.

Taken together, emotional journeys toward hedonic goals (i.e., toward positive and away from negative emotions) represent a path furthest removed from what is likely to occur if emotions are left unchecked. End-states equal, our overarching theory would broadly "rank" increasing positive (decreasing negative) emotions as furthest removed from the "easy" course of action, maintaining some level of positive emotions (keeping negative emotions steadily at bay) as midrange, and allowing positive emotions to decrease (negative emotions to increase) as the "easiest" path from a regulation perspective. Regardless of where they fall on the spectrum for type of regulation (from controlled to automatic regulation), journeys toward hedonic goals involve overriding or blocking the "easier" courses of action. Thus, as the severity of emotional journeys toward hedonic goals increases (increasing intensity of positive emotions, decreasing intensity of negative emotions; improving valence more generally), so too should the level of resources required to close the gap between the current state and the desired hedonic end-state.

> *Hypothesis 2:* Controlling for end-state affect, employees whose daily emotional journeys are more severe—their (a) PA trajectory is more positive (i.e., a steeper positive linear change in PA) and/or (b) NA trajectory is more negative (i.e., a steeper negative linear change in NA)—will experience greater depletion.

> *Corollary to Hypothesis 2:* Controlling for end-state valence, employees whose daily valence trajectory is more positive (i.e., a steeper positive linear change across all emotional experiences from negative to positive) will experience greater depletion.

Moderating Role of Neuroticism on Emotional Journeys

Of course, some employees may react to emotional journeys differently than others. Theories of self-regulation (and emotion regulation in particular) have long speculated that individual differences make certain employees more (or less) depleted following the same self-regulatory tasks (Johnson et al., 2017; McCrae & Löckenhoff, 2010). Likewise, hedonic approaches to emotion have emphasized that certain traits correlate to "hedonic level" and make negative emotions more likely (Diener et al., 1985). At the intersection of these theoretical perspectives is trait neuroticism. We argue that employees higher in neuroticism may need to devote more resources to build up positive emotions and reduce negative emotions; thus, longer emotional journeys toward hedonic goals will be more depleting for them.

Across contexts, neuroticism should enhance the depletion that follows self-regulation. Neuroticism has been theoretically and meta-analytically tied to avoidance motivation and avoidance goals (Carver et al., 2000; Lanaj et al., 2012). Instead of directly striving toward reaching hedonic goals (e.g., focusing on seeking out or capitalizing on positive emotions), avoidance goals make neurotic individuals more likely to focus on preventing failure to meet hedonic goals (e.g., constantly "scanning" for potential threats of negative emotions; Elliot, 2006). That is, they devote energy to monitoring for signs of failure and doing "damage control" after the fact. Characterized by constant, focused monitoring, this approach to self-regulation relies on a more demanding processing style that requires greater attention and psychological resources (Roskes et al., 2013). Moreover, cautiously waiting for threats of failure makes for a less efficient strategy of regulation. Indeed, self-regulation scholars have highlighted that "the maladaptive motivational skills and strategies associated with high neuroticism amplify the demands of self-control on regulatory resources" (Johnson et al., 2014, p. 639). With a tendency to pursue less efficient avoidance goals as a means of self-regulating, individuals higher in neuroticism should suffer greater depletion following emotional journeys toward hedonic goals.

In addition, from both hedonic and self-regulatory perspectives, individuals higher in neuroticism are prone to experience negative emotions (Elliot, 2006; Larsen, 2000; Larsen & Ketelaar, 1989). For example, when presented with the same stimuli, individuals higher in neuroticism are more likely to appraise it negatively or as a threat (Gallagher, 1990) and respond more strongly to negative mood inductions (Gross et al., 1998). Thus, their more "natural" emotional journeys likely follow the path ushered by the negativity bias—increases in negative emotions and decreases in positive emotions—to an extreme. Movement toward hedonic end-states thus requires those high in neuroticism to override their natural inclinations even more so than "average" individuals or those lower in neuroticism.

Taken together, emotional journeys toward hedonic goals are even further removed from what is probabilistically likely to occur for those high in trait neuroticism, and neurotic individuals are disadvantaged with less efficient regulation strategies when it comes time to "course correct." As such, we predict employees higher in trait neuroticism will be more depleted than less neurotic counterparts after intensifying positive emotions, reducing intensity of negative emotions, or improving valence more generally.

> *Hypothesis 3a:* Trait neuroticism will moderate the positive relationship between daily PA trajectory (i.e., a steeper positive linear change in PA) and depletion, such that the relationship is more positive when neuroticism is higher.

> *Hypothesis 3b:* Trait neuroticism will moderate the negative relationship between daily NA trajectory (i.e., a steeper negative linear change in NA) and depletion, such that the relationship is more negative when neuroticism is higher.

> *Corollary to Hypothesis 3:* Trait neuroticism will moderate the positive relationship between daily valence trajectory (i.e., a steeper positive linear change across all emotional experiences from negative to positive) and depletion, such that the relationship is more positive when neuroticism is higher.

Indirect Effects of Emotional Journeys on Employee Performance

Self-regulation theory has emphasized the importance of self-regulatory resources for peak performance (Baumeister et al., 2007; Baumeister & Vohs, 2003; Johnson et al., 2017). Indeed, job performance (conceptualized as any or all of three common indicators—counterproductive behavior, citizenship behavior, or task performance; Rotundo & Sackett, 2002) demands self-regulatory resources to be carried out optimally. For example, acts requiring self-control (e.g., dealing with others, behaving in socially desirable ways, self-monitoring, and counteracting impulses) may become particularly challenging as depletion sets in (Baumeister et al., 2007). It follows, then, that *interpersonal counterproductive work behavior* (CWBI)—dysfunctional interpersonal behaviors, such as criticizing, insulting, or excluding others (Robinson & Bennett, 1995)—should spike in absence of the resources needed to exercise control when dealing with others (e.g., Barnes et al., 2015; Courtright et al., 2016). OCB—characterized by its discretionary nature (Organ, 1997)—should similarly dwindle when sufficient regulatory resources are unavailable. Indeed, because OCB necessitates "going above and beyond" to benefit others/the organization (and overriding self-interest to do so), it is likely to suffer when the motivational willpower afforded by self-regulatory resources is lacking (e.g., Lin & Johnson, 2015). Finally, *task performance*—the core tasks and role responsibilities that make up the job (Borman & Motowidlo, 1997)—can also deteriorate as depletion sets in (e.g., Chi et al., 2015). Exemplar task performance requires effort, attention to detail, and perseverance (among other things)—all three of which demand self-regulatory resources (Johnson et al., 2017). In summary, as daily emotional journeys directed toward hedonic goals increase, they use greater self-regulatory resources. This leaves fewer intact for subsequent tasks that demand self-control (Baumeister et al., 1998) and should ultimately manifest as decreased performance (i.e., heightened CWBI, stifled OCB, and lowered task performance).

> *Hypothesis 4:* Controlling for end-state affect, employees whose daily emotional journeys are more severe—their (a) PA trajectory is more positive (i.e., a steeper positive linear change in PA) and/or (b) NA trajectory is more negative (i.e., a steeper negative linear change in NA)—will suffer lower performance (heightened CWBI, lowered OCB, and lowered task performance).

> *Corollary to Hypothesis 4:* Controlling for end-state valence, employees whose daily valence trajectory is more positive (i.e., a steeper positive linear change across all emotional experiences from negative to positive) will suffer lower performance (heightened CWBI, lowered OCB, and lowered task performance).

Together, our hypotheses imply moderated indirect effects. Because we expect those higher in trait neuroticism will suffer more depletion after greater journeys toward hedonic goals, the downstream effects of emotional journeys on performance (via depletion) should also be stronger for more neurotic individuals.

> *Hypothesis 5a:* Trait neuroticism will moderate the negative relationship between daily PA trajectory (i.e., a steeper positive linear change in PA) and performance (measured with CWBI, OCB, and task performance) via depletion, such that the relationship is more negative when neuroticism is higher.

> *Hypothesis 5b:* Trait neuroticism will moderate the positive relationship between daily NA trajectory (i.e., a steeper negative linear change in NA) and performance (measured with CWBI, OCB, and task performance) via depletion, such that the relationship is more positive when neuroticism is higher.

> *Corollary to Hypothesis 5:* Trait neuroticism will moderate the negative relationship between daily valence trajectory (i.e., a steeper positive linear change across all emotional experiences from negative to positive) and performance (measured with CWBI, OCB, and task performance) via depletion, such that the relationship is more negative when neuroticism is higher.

Study 1 Method

Sample and Procedure

Given our focus on dynamic changes in affect and the immediate depletion that follows, we utilized an experience sampling methodology (ESM) in the field. This approach provided the best test of our theorizing and aligned our examination with the approach applied in existing field work conducted on affect shifts (e.g., Bledow et al., 2011, 2013; Yang et al., 2016). The technique minimizes memory, recall, and method biases (Beal, 2015; Gabriel et al., 2019) and allowed us to utilize five surveys throughout the workday to closely monitor changes in affect as they took place while still time separating each piece of our model (Podsakoff et al., 2003, 2012). To capture a wide array of employees and positions, we recruited full-time working adults from a university alumni pool and online advertisements. To be eligible, participants needed to work at least 35 hr each week and work in a position with daily coworker interaction. Participants verified that they met these criteria when they registered. At this time, they also provided demographic information, their working hours, and ratings of neuroticism. They were compensated $5 for registering.

Two weeks after the registration survey, the daily surveys began. For 10 workdays, employees completed five surveys customized to their unique working hours. Survey 1 was sent out at the beginning of their workday, and each subsequent survey was sent 2 hr after the previous. Participants were sent text reminders and emails as each survey became available, as surveys 1–4 closed after only 90 min, and Survey 5 closed after 2 hr. Participants were urged to complete each survey as soon as possible, and received $1 for each daily survey, plus a $4 bonus for each day that they completed all five surveys. This data collection was deemed exempt by University of Georgia's Institutional Review Board (IRB) (STUDY00006033: An Investigation of Employee Relationships).

Of the 177 employees who registered for our study, 162 participated in the daily surveys. Ultimately, we obtained 1,300 usable observations from a possible 1,620 (80% response rate). In our final sample, 67.9% of the participants were female, the average age was 41.4 (SD = 13.0), and demographic information was as follows: 6% Asian or Pacific Islander, 4% Black or African American, 6% Hispanic or Latino, 83% White or Caucasian, and 1% other. Participants occupied positions in a variety of industries, such as design, social services, education, finance, healthcare, retail, engineering, real estate, etc.

Measures

All measures were rated on a 5-point Likert scale (from *strongly disagree* to *strongly agree*) unless otherwise noted. We followed recent recommendations for multilevel data (Gabriel et al., 2019; Geldhof et al., 2014) and calculated reliabilities of our measures using two-level alpha at the within- and between-person levels.

Trait Neuroticism

Employees completed the eight-item measure of neuroticism (Saucier, 1994) in the registration survey (2 weeks before beginning the daily surveys). They were asked to rate how much the words describe themselves in general. Example statements are "temperamental" and "touchy." The between-person alpha was .81.

Positive Affect/Negative Affect

Employees rated PA and NA three times each day (Times 1–3). To align our work with the affect and affect shift literatures, they used the 10-item short form Positive and Negative Affect Schedule (MacKinnon et al., 1999). Measured this way, PA and NA capture high activation positive and negative emotions. Items were rated on a 5-point Likert scale (from *very slightly/not at all* to *very much*). In keeping with other experience sampling studies, the prompt for each measure of PA and NA instructed employees to rate how much the words describe how they feel "right now." Time 1, 2, and 3 ratings were used to estimate the daily trajectory variables. At Time 1 and 2, respectively, the within-person (between-person) two-level alphas for PA were .85 and .83 (.93 and .91); for NA, they were .84 and .83 (.94 and .95).

End-State PA/NA

Time 3 PA/NA ratings were entered into our model to capture and control for end-state emotions. At Time 3, the within-person (between-person) two-level alpha for PA was .83 (.90); for NA, it was .84 (.95).

PA/NA Trajectories

Given that emotional journeys are defined as the distance and direction in moving from an emotional origin to an emotional end point, we operationalize these journeys using linear change trajectories. Prior to estimating linear change trajectories, we confirmed that the multilevel confirmatory factor analysis (MCFA) of PA/NA with item-level indicators across the three time points fit the data well: $\chi^2[360] = 2378.855$, $p < .05$; Comparative Fit Index (CFI) = .936; Root Mean Square Error of Approximation (RMSEA) = .07; Standardized Root Mean Square Residual (SRMR) within = .06, providing support for configural invariance (i.e., consistent factor structure across the time points; Vandenberg & Morelli, 2016). We constrained factor loadings to be equal across all time points, and our measurement model still fit the data well: $\chi^2[376] = 2467.005$, $p < .05$; CFI = .934; RMSEA = .07; SRMRwithin = .06. These minor changes in fit (ΔCFI < .01; ΔRMSEA < .015) provide evidence of metric invariance across time (Chen, 2007; Cheung & Rensvold, 2002; Maynard et al., 2014). We then used latent growth modeling to confirm that a linear model fit the data well —$\chi^2[7] = 45.281$, $p < .05$; CFI = .99; RMSEA = .06; SRMR = .02—and better than alternative models. Specifically, we used the Satorra–Bentler scaled chi-square difference test to compare linear models to intercepts-only models (TRd = 57.79, $\Delta df = 9$, $p < .001$), and the linear growth model provided superior fit to the data (Satorra & Bentler, 2010). Finally, we confirmed that there was sufficient variance in slopes by examining the variance components for PA/NA trajectories in our data ($p < .001$). Taken together, these analyses suggest measurement equivalence of PA/NA over time and support our use of PA/NA linear change trajectories.

We used the three ratings of PA and NA to calculate daily trajectories. Following recent work on change trajectories (e.g., Chen, 2005; Chen et al., 2011; Hausknecht et al., 2011; Liu et al., 2012), we used the Bayes slope estimate produced in hierarchical linear models (i.e., mixed-effects growth models) to capture affect changes. In other words, we specified two mixed-level random slopes models—one where we regressed daily PA on time (to produce daily PA slopes spanning from Time 1 to Time 3) and one where we regressed daily NA on time (to produce daily NA slopes spanning from Time 1 to Time 3). We saved the slope estimates for each day within individuals to serve as our PA and NA trajectories. These variables track the direction and magnitude of emotional journeys in PA and NA separately, allowing us to capture emotional journey variables in a way that aligns with past affect shift work.

Because they are slopes, our uncentered trajectory variables take on values that range from negative to positive numbers. For both PA and NA trajectories, a value of zero indicates steady (or unchanging) PA/NA over the three measurements. For PA trajectories, higher positive values indicate increasing intensity of high activation, positive emotions, while more negative values indicate decreasing intensity of high activation, positive emotions. For NA trajectories, more negative values indicate decreasing intensity of high activation, negative emotions, while higher positive values indicate increasing intensity of high activation, negative emotions. Together, movement toward hedonic goals would contain a greater positive PA trajectory and a greater negative NA trajectory.

Valence/Activation End-States and Trajectories

Though PA/NA trajectories and end-states align our work with the broader affect literature, high activation positive and negative emotions are not exhaustive accounts of what employees may experience—they represent only two of eight broader emotion categories (Larsen & Diener, 1992; Remington et al., 2000; see Figure 1). Thus, we also captured ratings of emotions characterized by low, neutral, and high activation as well as negative, neutral, and positive valence to examine between-emotion changes around the circumplex. This alternative operationalization of emotional journeys (which incorporates the complete range of emotions) consists of *valence trajectories* (i.e., improvements/decrements in valence, where positive slopes indicate movement from more negative toward more positive emotions; negative slopes indicate movement from more positive toward more negative emotions) and *activation trajectories* (i.e., increases/decreases in activation, where positive slopes indicate movement from less to more activated emotion states).

Employees rated emotions from each octant of the affect circumplex three times each day (Times 1–3) using the six emotions within each octant identified by Larsen and Diener (1992; see also Bartel & Saavedra, 2000; see Figure 1 for all items). Items were rated on a 5-point Likert scale (from *very slightly/not at all* to *very much*), and the prompt for each measure of emotions instructed employees to rate how much the words describe how they feel “right now.”

We calculated the scale score within each emotion octant to identify the “dominant” emotion at Times 1–3 and coded the valence and activation at each time point. We coded the valence score as -1 when the dominant emotion was negative, 0 when the dominant emotion was neutral valence, and $+1$ when the dominant emotion was positive. We coded the activation score as -1 when the dominant emotion was low activation, 0 when the dominant emotion was neutral activation, and $+1$ when the dominant emotion was high activation (see Figure 1). For example, if an employee’s “dominant” emotion at Time 1 was low activation, negative emotions, they got a -1 for activation and a -1 for valence. If an employee’s “dominant” emotion at Time 1 was neutral activation, positive emotions, they got a 0 for activation and a $+1$ for valence. When ties happened (i.e., an employee had more than one highest-rated emotion octant), we averaged the would-be scores of each (e.g., an employee that tied between low activation, negative emotions, and neutral activation, positive emotions would get a $-.5$ for activation and a 0 for valence). If we instead exclude cases with no single “dominant” emotion or if we weight our coding scheme by the rating of the dominant emotions, the conclusions for tests of our hypotheses are unchanged.

The Time 3 valence and activation scores were used to represent end-state valence and activation. Parallel to our construction of

Figure 1

The Self-Report Circumplex Model of Mood (Larsen & Diener, 1992)



Note. For Study 1: The thick arrows pointing outward from the center of the circle depict positive affect/negative affect (PA/NA) trajectories (changes within-emotion in the intensity of strictly high activation, positive and negative emotions). Valence and activation trajectories (movement across/between emotions of different valences and activations around the complete circumplex) were calculated with the dominant emotion at each time point using the coding scheme presented in **bold** above each octant. For Study 2: The dotted bidirectional arrow line represents neutral activation valence changes that were manipulated in the lab.

PA/NA trajectories, we calculated the valence and activation trajectories as the Bayes slope estimate produced in hierarchical linear models when measuring changes in valence and activation over Time 1, 2, and 3. Though the coded nature of the variables prevented us from testing for measurement invariance, we again used latent growth modeling to confirm that a linear model fit the data well—$\chi^2[4] = 28.911$, $p < .05$; CFI = .97; RMSEA = .06; SRMR = .02—and better than an intercepts-only model (TRd = 81.46, $\Delta df = 9$, $p < .001$) (Satorra & Bentler, 2010).[2] We also confirmed there was sufficient variance in slopes by examining the variance components for valence/activation trajectories in our data ($p < .001$).

Depletion

Employees rated depletion at Time 4 using the five-item measure from Lanaj et al. (2014). The prompt instructed employees to rate

[2] Because valence and activation scores are decomposed from the same dominant emotion(s), we allowed the error terms for activation and valence to covary at each discrete time point (Cole et al., 2007).

how they feel "right now." An example item is "I feel drained." The within-person (between-person) two-level alpha was .91 (.98).

Performance Measures

Employees rated performance at the end of the day (Time 5). Because the survey closed after 2 hr, the prompt instructed employees to rate the statements "based on how they have behaved over the past several hours." They rated CWBI with the six-item measure from Dalal et al. (2009), and an example item is "I behaved in an unpleasant manner toward my coworkers." They rated OCB with the eight-item measure from Dalal et al. (2009), and an example item is "I volunteered to do something that was not required." Finally, they rated task performance with the nine-item individual task behaviors measure from Griffin et al. (2007), and an example item is "I completed my core tasks well using the standard procedures." The within-person (between-person) two-level alpha was .86 (.96) for CWBI, .82 (.96) for OCB, and .86 (.93) for task performance.

Emotion Regulation

Though a key contribution of our work is that emotional journeys toward hedonic goals capture the *amount* of emotion regulation undergone, there are different ways one might go about regulating. Thus, at Time 4 in the daily surveys, we collected the ratings of authentic (i.e., automatically regulated) emotions with three items from Diefendorff et al. (2005). An example item is "today, the emotions I showed at work came naturally." The within-person (between-person) two-level alpha was .91 (.99). We also collected daily use of antecedent- and response-focused regulation strategies at that time. We created seven statements based off of the scales in Schutte et al. (2009) and asked participants to select all statements that were true of their behavior that day. Antecedent-focused strategies included situation selection, situation modification, attentional deployment, and cognitive change; response-focused strategies included behavioral, experiential, and physiological modulation (Gross, 1998). An example antecedent-focused statement is "I spent time in situations that helped me feel emotions I wanted to have and that prevented emotions I did not want to have," and an example response-focused statement is "I focused/concentrated on the emotions I wanted to last and not on the emotions I did not want." We then created count variables for each ranging from 0 = *no use* to 4 = *use of all four antecedent-focused strategies* and 0 = *no use* to 3 = *use of all three response-focused strategies*.

Controls

We controlled for lagged values of all dependent variables to better establish our presumed causal order (Beal, 2015) and interpret our results as a change from the previous day (Johnson et al., 2014; Scott & Barnes, 2011). We also followed recommendations from Gabriel et al. (2019) and controlled for potential cyclical effects due to the day of the study by controlling for the day as well as the sine and cosine waves. We note that the conclusions of our hypothesis tests are identical with and without the control variables in the model.

Analysis

We tested our hypotheses with multilevel path analysis in Mplus 8.4 (Muthén & Muthén, 2010). In line with other affect shift research and best practices for experience sampling studies (Hofmann & Gavin, 1998), we person-mean centered our Level 1 independent variables and grand-mean centered our Level 2 moderator. This controls for between-person differences (Enders & Tofighi, 2007) and allows us to interpret results as the relationship between emotional journeys and depletion relative to each person's average emotional journey and subsequent depletion. We modeled hypothesized pathways with random slopes and controlled pathways with fixed slopes to reduce unnecessary model complexity (Beal, 2015) and preserve observations. We tested our indirect effect hypotheses using parametric bootstrapping (Preacher et al., 2010) and used a Monte Carlo simulation with 20,000 resamples to build bias-corrected confidence intervals around the indirect effects (e.g., see Baer et al., 2018; Matta et al., 2017).

Consistent with other studies that have used Bayes slope estimates to examine linear change (e.g., Chen, 2005; Chen et al., 2011; Hausknecht et al., 2011; Liu et al., 2012) and other latent growth modeling techniques, we incorporate one indicator of "slope" (i.e., affect trajectory), and one indicator of "level" or "intercept" (i.e., end-state affect) for each metric of emotional experiences (e.g., PA trajectory and end-state PA). Simultaneously modeling an indicator of affect level with the trajectory is necessary to separate the effects owing to each—the effects owing to affect change (the trajectory) versus affect level (the end-state). Because our theorizing focuses specifically on "snapshots" of final emotions while taking into account the magnitude and direction of the journey that produced the emotions (captured with trajectories), using end-state affect as our metric of "level" closely aligns with our theory and provides the most appropriate test.

Study 1 Results

Descriptive Statistics and Correlations

The mean values, standard deviations, correlations, and reliabilities are shown in Tables 1 and 2. We also estimated null models for each of our Level 1 variables to partition the within- and between-person variance in each construct. Each of our constructs demonstrated sufficient variance at the within-person level, and the proportions we observed compare favorably to recent work that has examined intrapersonal variance (Podsakoff et al., 2019). The percentages of variability within-individual for end-state PA and NA were 44% and 57%, respectively; PA and NA trajectories were 78% and 100%, respectively; end-state valence and activation were 73% and 80%, respectively; valence and activation trajectories were 94% and 93%, respectively; depletion was 48%; and CWBI was 44%, OCB was 41%, and task performance was 52%.

Test of Measurement Model

Prior to testing our hypotheses, we conducted a MCFA to ensure the constructs assessed were distinct. We estimated a seven-factor model (end-state PA, end-state NA, depletion, CWBI, OCB, and task performance at Level 1 and neuroticism at Level 2) using item-level indicators. Consistent with its operationalization, we modeled task performance with three first-order latent constructs—task

Table 1

Study 1 PA/NA Model and Exploratory Variable Mean Values, Standard Deviations, and Correlations (PA/NA = Positive Affect/Negative Affect; CWBI = Counterproductive Work behavior; OCB = Citizenship Behavior)

	Variable	*M*	*SD*	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16
	Level 1 variables																		
1	Time 1 PA	2.51	0.57	(.85)	.05	.87*	−.01	.72*	−.47*	.03	−.04	−.27*	−.07	.33*	.35*	.23*	.17*	.15	—
2	Time 1 NA	1.31	0.43	−.19*	(.84)	.00	.88*	−.01	−.09	.87*	−.37*	.45*	.27*	−.08	.13	−.20*	.10	.07	—
3	Time 2 PA	2.69	0.55	.47*	−.14*	(.83)	−.07	.84*	−.09	.00	.02	−.32*	−.12	.38*	.45*	.27*	.18*	.20*	—
4	Time 2 NA	1.30	0.39	−.10*	.52*	−.20*	(.83)	.02	.04	.77*	−.32*	.52*	.27*	−.05	−.07	−.18*	.16*	.08	—
5	End-state PA (Time 3)	2.68	0.55	.25*	−.06*	.41*	−.13*	(.83)	.34*	−.05	−.02	−.24*	−.10	.36*	.40*	.26*	.22*	.19*	—
6	PA trajectory (Times 1–3)	0.08	0.34	−.63*	.11*	−.07*	−.02	.59*	—	−.09	.03	.04	−.06	−.00	.01	.04	.05	.03	—
7	End-state NA (Time 3)	1.31	0.41	−.05	.38*	−.13*	.53*	−.25*	−.15*	(.84)	.14	.46*	.26*	−.10	−.14	−.27*	.08	.09	—
8	NA trajectory (Times 1–3)	−0.00	0.23	.12*	−.59*	.01	−.02	−.16*	−.23*	.52*	—	−.05	.01	−.05	−.05	−.12	−.05	.04	—
9	Depletion (Time 4)	1.93	0.69	−.12*	.16*	−.17*	.24*	−.20*	−.06*	.24*	.06*	(.91)	.34*	−.26*	−.17*	−.29*	.01	−.13	—
10	CWBI (Time 5)	1.35	0.42	.05	−.01	−.04	.02	−.08*	−.10*	.07*	.07*	.11*	(.86)	−.14	−.13	−.40*	.12	.12	—
11	OCB (Time 5)	3.74	0.44	.05	−.07*	.11*	−.04	.15*	.07*	−.07*	.01	−.12*	−.16*	(.82)	.71*	.46*	.14	.08	—
12	Task performance (Time 5)	3.43	0.43	.06*	−.06*	.13*	−.02	.13*	.05	−.06*	.00	−.13*	−.11*	.42*	(.86)	.41*	.20*	.19*	—
	Exploratory																		
13	Authentic emotions (Time 4)	3.75	0.56	.07*	−.09*	.04	−.07*	.10*	.02	−.10*	−.01	−.14*	−.08*	.11*	.14*	(.91)	.00	−.04	—
14	Antecedent-focused regulation (Time 4)	1.42	0.88	.06*	.02	.06*	−.03	.13*	.05	.04	.02	−.03	.02	.02	.06*	.08*	—	.86*	—
15	Response-focused regulation (Time 4)	0.94	0.72	.07*	.02	.11*	−.02	.07*	−.01	.07*	.04	.00	.03	.02	.01	.02	.49*	—	—
	Level 2 variable																		
16	Neuroticism (Time 0)	2.43	0.59	−.26*	.04	−.32*	.11	−.31*	−.04	.08	.06	.25*	.09	−.18*	−.28*	−.12	−.06	−.09	(.81)

Note. Level 1 $N = 1{,}300$; Level 2 $N = 162$. Reliabilities are reported on the diagonal (within-person reliabilities for Level 1 variables and between-person reliabilities for Level 2 variables). Correlations above the diagonal represent the between level and are pooled within-person correlations. Variables in the main model are **bolded**.

* $p < .05$.

Table 2

Study 1 Valence/Activation Model Mean Values, Standard Deviations, and Correlations (CWBI = Counterproductive Work behavior; OCB = Citizenship Behavior)

Variable	*M*	*SD*	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13
Level 1 variables															
1 Time 1 valence	0.53	0.58	—	.00	.83*	−.11	.68*	−.54*	−.08	−.05	−.57*	−.25*	.17*	.24*	—
2 Time 1 activation	−0.23	0.59	−.21*	—	−.01	.58*	−.05	−.05	.50*	−.53*	−.02	.02	.21*	.13	—
3 Time 2 valence	0.60	0.53	.36*	−.05	—	−.28*	.72*	−.30*	−.15	−.10	−.62*	−.31*	.18*	.20*	—
4 Time 2 activation	−0.07	0.59	−.09*	.21*	−.38*	—	−.14	.01	.68*	.01	.15	.00	.16*	.11	—
5 End-state valence (Time 3)	0.60	0.51	.22*	−.03	.40*	−.10*	—	.24*	−.26*	−.16*	−.52*	−.28*	.20*	.22*	—
6 Valence trajectory (Times 1–3)	0.03	0.34	−.68*	.16*	−.01	.01	.56*	—	−.21*	−.16*	.19*	.01	.01	−.03	—
7 End-State Activation (Time 3)	−0.05	0.57	−.02	.04	−.04	.19*	−.31*	−.21*	—	.43*	.06	−.08	.12	.03	—
8 Activation trajectory (Times 1–3)	0.09	0.40	.14*	−.70*	.01	−.03	−.20*	−.27*	.68*	—	.03	−.14	−.08	−.11	—
9 Depletion (Time 4)	1.93	0.69	−.16*	−.02	−.24*	.02	−.26*	−.07*	−.01	.02	(.91)	.34*	−.26*	−.17*	—
10 CWBI (Time 5)	1.35	0.42	−.03	.03	−.05	.00	−.07*	−.02	−.03	−.04	.11*	(.86)	−.14	−.13	—
11 OCB (Time 5)	3.74	0.44	.03	.01	.08*	.03	.07*	.03	.03	.01	−.12*	−.16*	(.82)	.71*	—
12 Task performance (Time 5)	3.43	0.43	−.01	.06*	.04	.06*	.08*	.07*	.02	−.03	−.13*	−.11*	.42*	(.86)	—
Level 2 variable															
13 Neuroticism (Time 0)	2.43	0.59	−.34*	−.10	−.42*	−.00	−.32*	.10	−.10	−.02	.25*	.09	−.18*	−.28*	(.81)

Note. Level 1 $N = 1{,}300$; Level 2 $N = 162$. Reliabilities are reported on the diagonal (within-person reliabilities for Level 1 variables and between-person reliabilities for Level 2 variables). Correlations above the diagonal represent the between level and are pooled within-person correlations. Variables in the main model are **bolded**.
* $p < .05$.

proficiency, task adaptivity, and task proactivity (Griffin et al., 2007). Results suggested that our model provided an acceptable fit to the data: $\chi^2[667] = 4682.19$, $p < .05$; CFI = .90; RMSEA = .07; SRMRwithin = .08. Moreover, we ran all possible six-factor alternative models in which we tested combinations of our Level 1 variables. Our seven-factor model fit the data significantly better than any of the alternatives: $\Delta\chi^2$s($\Delta df = 5$) 1,677.99–5,920.48.

Hypothesis Testing

Results of our multilevel path analysis are shown in Tables 3 and 4 and Figures 2 and 3. In Hypothesis 1a, we predicted a negative relationship between end-state PA and depletion. The coefficient for the path from end-state PA to depletion was negative and significant ($\gamma = -.26$, $p < .05$), indicating that when employees' end-state PA was higher, they showed lower levels of subsequent depletion. In Hypothesis 1b, we predicted a positive relationship between end-state NA and depletion. The coefficient for the path from end-state NA to depletion was positive and significant ($\gamma = .36$, $p < .05$), indicating that when employees' end-state NA was lower, they showed lower levels of depletion. Hypotheses 1a and 1b were supported with our PA/NA measures. Turning to the alternative operationalization of emotional journeys, the coefficient for the path from end-state valence to depletion was negative and significant ($\gamma = -.47$, $p < .05$; Table 4, Models 6, 7). Thus, consistent with past work that highlights the upsides (costs) of positive (negative) emotions, we reaffirm support for Hypotheses 1a and 1b (and support Corollary 1): Ending with more positively valenced emotions was associated with lower depletion. Because valence end-state exists independently of activation end-state (which we also controlled for; $\gamma = -.17$, $p < .05$), we demonstrate that positive valence *alone* drives these effects.

In Hypothesis 2a, we predicted a positive relationship between PA trajectory and depletion. The coefficient for the path from PA trajectory to depletion was positive and significant ($\gamma = .16$, $p < .05$), indicating that when employees experienced an increase in the intensity of positive, activated emotions, they showed higher levels of depletion. Thus, Hypothesis 2a was supported. In Hypothesis 2b, we predicted a negative relationship between NA trajectory and depletion. The coefficient for the path from NA trajectory to depletion was nonsignificant ($\gamma = -.16$, *ns*). Thus, we did not find support for Hypothesis 2b. Though increasing intensity of PA seemed to deplete employees, decreasing intensity of NA showed no significant effect on depletion. With our alternative operationalization of emotional journeys, we tested Corollary 2. In our valence and activation model, the coefficient for the path from valence trajectory to depletion was positive and significant ($\gamma = .22$, $p < .05$). Thus, the act of changing from more negative to more positive emotions was associated with heightened depletion, and this effect existed independent of activation trajectory (again controlled for; $\gamma = .13$, $p < .05$).

In Hypotheses 3a and 3b, we predicted that trait neuroticism will moderate the relationships between daily PA/NA trajectories and depletion, such that the positive PA trajectory-depletion relationship will be more positive when neuroticism is higher, and the negative NA trajectory-depletion relationship will be more negative when neuroticism is higher. Trait neuroticism did not moderate the paths from PA/NA trajectories to depletion ($\gamma = -.15$, *ns*; $\gamma = -.08$, *ns*, respectively). Thus, our results did not support Hypotheses 3a and 3b.

Table 3

Study 1 Results of Multilevel Path Analysis for Within-Emotion Intensity Changes (PA/NA End-States and PA/NA Trajectories) (PA/NA = Positive Affect/Negative Affect; CWBI = Counterproductive Work behavior; OCB = Citizenship Behavior)

Variables	Model 1: Depletion		Model 2: Depletion		Model 3: CWBI		Model 4: OCB		Model 5: Task performance	
	γ	*SE*	γ	*SE*	γ	*SE*	γ	*SE*	γ	*SE*
Intercept	1.82*	(.11)	1.82*	(.11)	.91*	(.12)	3.12*	(.19)	2.93*	(.24)
Controls										
Sine	.03	(.03)	.03	(.03)	.01	(.02)	−.04*	(.02)	−.01	(.02)
Cosine	−.01	(.03)	−.01	(.03)	−.00	(.02)	−.03	(.02)	−.02	(.02)
Day	−.01	(.01)	−.01	(.01)	.00	(.01)	.01	(.01)	−.01	(.01)
Level 1 predictors										
Previous day depletion (t4)	.08*	(.04)	.09*	(.04)	—	—	—	—	—	—
Previous day CWBI (t5)	—	—	—	—	.18*	(.07)	—	—	—	—
Previous day OCB (t5)	—	—	—	—	—	—	.18*	(.05)	—	—
Previous day performance (t5)	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	.19*	(.06)
End-state PA (t3)	**−.26***	(.05)	**−.26***	(.05)	.00	(.03)	.11*	(.04)	.09*	(.04)
PA trajectory (t1–t3)	**.17***	(.07)	**.16***	(.07)	−.11*	(.05)	−.01	(.05)	−.02	(.05)
End-state NA (t3)	**.36***	(.07)	**.36***	(.07)	−.02	(.04)	−.02	(.04)	−.03	(.04)
NA trajectory (t1–t3)	**−.16**	(.12)	**−.16**	(.12)	.08	(.07)	.04	(.07)	.06	(.07)
Level 1 mediator										
Depletion (t4)	—	—	—	—	**.09***	(.02)	**−.06***	(.02)	**−.06***	(.02)
Level 2 predictor										
Neuroticism (t0)	—	—	.28*	(.09)	—	—	—	—	—	—
Cross-level interactions										
PA Trajectory × Neuroticism	—	—	**−.15**	(.11)	—	—	—	—	—	—
NA Trajectory × Neuroticism	—	—	**−.08**	(.16)	—	—	—	—	—	—
R^2 (Day-level)	21%	—	21%	—	4%	—	5%	—	3%	—

Note. Level 1 $N = 1{,}300$; Level 2 $N = 162$. Hypothesized paths are **bolded.** For PA trajectories, higher positive values indicate increasing intensity of high activation, positive emotions, while more negative values indicate decreasing intensity of high activation, positive emotions. For NA trajectories, more negative values indicate decreasing intensity of high activation, negative emotions, while higher positive values indicate increasing intensity of high activation, negative emotions. For both PA and NA trajectories, a value of zero indicates steady (or unchanging) PA/NA over the three measurements.
* $p < .05$

Corollary 3 and our theorizing suggest neuroticism will also moderate the relationship between valence trajectory and depletion, such that it will be more positive when neuroticism is higher. With our alternative operationalization, neuroticism did not moderate the path from valence trajectory to depletion (γ = .03, *ns*), aligning with our findings outlined above. Interestingly, however, teasing apart changes in valence from changes in activation allowed for other exploratory insights: Neuroticism *did* moderate the path from activation trajectory to depletion (γ = .17, $p < .05$; Table 4, Model 7), such that the positive relationship was stronger when neuroticism was higher. Our results extend work on both affect and personality, as we unpack the specific component of emotions (i.e., activation but not valence, contrary to theorizing on neuroticism; Diener et al., 1985) that appears particularly draining to regulate when individuals are higher in neuroticism.

In Hypothesis 4a, we predicted that PA trajectory will be indirectly negatively associated with performance via depletion. In line with our prediction, the path from depletion to CWBI was positive and significant (γ = .09, $p < .05$), while the paths from depletion to OCB (γ = −.06, $p < .05$) and task performance (γ = −.06, $p < .05$) were negative and significant. The 95% bias-corrected confidence interval for each indirect effect excluded zero (ind. effect to CWBI = .01, 95% CI [.002, .034]; to OCB = −.01, 95% CI [−.024, −.001]; to task performance = −.01, 95% CI [−.026, −.001]), supporting Hypothesis 4a. In Hypothesis 4b, we predicted that NA trajectory will be indirectly positively associated with performance via depletion. However, we found no significant relationship between NA trajectory and depletion, and the 95% bias-corrected confidence intervals for the indirect effects of NA trajectory on CWBI (95% CI [−.044, .004]), OCB (95% CI [−.002, .030]), and task performance (95% CI [−.003, .033]) all included zero. Thus, Hypothesis 4b was not supported. The corollary of Hypothesis 4 and our theory is that improving valence will be indirectly negatively associated with performance via depletion. Results from our alternative operationalization of emotional journeys supported this, as the path from depletion to CWBI was positive and significant (γ = .09, $p < .05$), while the paths from depletion to OCB (γ = −.07, $p < .05$) and task performance (γ = −.07, $p < .05$) were negative and significant. Supporting Corollary 4, the 95% bias-corrected confidence interval for each indirect effect excluded zero (ind. effect to CWBI = .02, 95% CI [.006, .042]; to OCB = −.02, 95% CI [−.033, −.004]; to task performance = −.02, 95% CI [−.034, −.004]).

In Hypotheses 5a and 5b, we predicted that neuroticism will moderate the negative indirect effect of PA trajectory on performance via depletion and the positive indirect effect of NA trajectory on performance via depletion. Neuroticism did not moderate the relationships between PA/NA trajectories and depletion, and our results did not support Hypotheses 5a and 5b. The 95% bias-corrected confidence interval for the differences in indirect effects included zero for PA trajectory and NA trajectory on CWBI (95% CI [−.039, .006]; [−.041, .021], respectively), OCB (95% CI [−.003, .026]; [−.012, .028]), and task performance (95% CI [−.003, .030]; [−.014, .030]). Similarly, the 95% bias-corrected confidence

Table 4
Study 1 Results of Multilevel Path Analysis for Between-Emotion Valence/Activation Changes (CWBI = Counterproductive Work Behavior; OCB = Citizenship Behavior)

Variables	Model 6: Depletion		Model 7: Depletion		Model 8: CWBI		Model 9: OCB		Model 10: Task performance	
	γ	*SE*	γ	*SE*	γ	*SE*	γ	*SE*	γ	*SE*
Intercept	1.79*	(.11)	1.79*	(.11)	.91*	(.13)	3.14*	(.19)	2.93*	(.23)
Controls										
Sine	.02	(.03)	.02	(.03)	.01	(.02)	−.03	(.02)	−.01	(.02)
Cosine	−.02	(.03)	−.02	(.03)	−.00	(.02)	−.02	(.02)	−.01	(.02)
Day	−.01	(.01)	−.01	(.01)	.00	(.01)	.01	(.01)	−.01	(.01)
Level 1 predictors										
Previous day depletion (t4)	.10*	(.04)	.10*	(.04)	—	—	—	—	—	—
Previous day CWBI (t5)	—	—	—	—	.18*	(.07)	—	—	—	—
Previous day OCB (t5)	—	—	—	—	—	—	.19*	(.05)	—	—
Previous day performance (t5)	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	.20*	(.06)
End-state valence (t3)	**−.47***	(.05)	**−.47***	(.05)	−.03	(.03)	.04	(.03)	.04	(.03)
Valence trajectory (t1–t3)	**.22***	(.08)	**.22***	(.08)	.00	(.04)	.02	(.04)	.05	(.04)
End-state activation (t3)	−.17*	(.05)	−.17*	(.05)	−.01	(.03)	.05	(.03)	.07	(.04)
Activation trajectory (t1–t3)	.13*	(.06)	.12	(.06)	−.04	(.04)	−.01	(.04)	−.07	(.05)
Level 1 mediator										
Depletion (t4)	—	—	—	—	**.09***	(.02)	**−.07***	(.02)	**−.07***	(.02)
Level 2 predictors										
Neuroticism (t0)	—	—	.28*	(.09)	—	—	—	—	—	—
Cross-level interactions										
Valence Trajectory × Neuroticism	—	—	**.03**	(.11)	—	—	—	—	—	—
Activation Trajectory × Neuroticism	—	—	.17*	(.08)	—	—	—	—	—	—
R^2 (Day-level)	16%	—	17%	—	3%	—	3%	—	3%	—

Note. Level 1 N = 1,300; Level 2 N = 162. Hypothesized paths are bolded. For valence trajectories, higher positive values indicate movement from more negative toward more positive emotions, while more negative values indicate movement from more positive toward more negative emotions. For activation trajectories, higher positive values indicate movement from less to more activated emotion states, while more negative values indicate movement from more to less activated emotion states. For both valence and activation trajectories, a value of zero indicates steady (or unchanging) valance/activation over the three measurements.
$^*p < .05$

interval for the differences in indirect effects included zero for the relationship between valence trajectory and CWBI (95% CI [−.017, .026]), OCB (95% CI [−.018, .014]), and task performance (95% CI [−.018, .015]) via depletion (failing to support Corollary 5). Given that neuroticism did significantly moderate the path from activation trajectory to depletion, we conducted exploratory analyses on the moderated indirect effect of activation trajectory on performance. We found that the 95% bias-corrected confidence interval for the differences in indirect effects excluded zero for CWBI (95% CI [.002, .036]), OCB (95% CI [−.028, −.001]), and task performance (95% CI [−.030, −.001]). In summary, the indirect effect of activation trajectory (but not PA/NA or valence trajectory) on performance via depletion was significantly stronger (more harmful) when employees were higher in neuroticism.

Supplementary Analyses: Expanding the Emotional Journeys Construct

We have theorized that emotion regulation toward hedonic goals can be conscious (i.e., controlled) and/or automatic, and we argued that *both* forms of regulation will be depleting. To test this assumption, we explored whether more naturally propelled emotional journeys (i.e., those that result from more authentic emotions and are automatically regulated) could lessen or even neutralize the relationships between greater emotional journeys toward hedonic goals and depletion (Table 5, Models 11, 13). In line with our theory, daily experience of authentic emotions did *not* moderate or nullify the relationships between PA trajectory and depletion (interaction term = −.07, *ns*) or valence trajectory and depletion (interaction term = −.06, *ns*). This test gives credence to the notion that automatic regulation toward hedonic goals inherent in more natural emotional experiences is still depleting and contributes to nascent work on automatic emotion regulation where empirical results have been mixed at best (Fitzsimons & Bargh, 2004).

Though little is known about automatic regulation, theories of emotion regulation clearly suggest that certain types of controlled regulation may be particularly draining. Specifically, scholars have argued that controlled regulation can take place at two points in time—before or after the emotion is generated (Gross, 1998; Gross & Muñoz, 1995). When employees consciously attempt to regulate emotions *after* emotional response tendencies have already been elicited (i.e., they utilize response-focused regulation strategies), the process of regulating should be especially difficult and, thus, deplete more resources (Gross, 1998). Alternatively, when employees use regulation tactics that "get out in front" of the emotion (i.e., they utilize antecedent-focused regulation strategies), the process may be a bit easier. To probe this possibility, we conducted exploratory analyses to test whether heightened use of antecedent- and/or response-focused emotion regulation strategies moderated the relationships between greater emotional journeys and depletion (Table 5, Models 12, 14).

Table 5
Study 1 Results of Multilevel Path Analysis Exploring Emotion Regulation Types (PA/NA = Positive Affect/Negative Affect)

Variables	Model 11: Depletion		Model 12: Depletion		Model 13: Depletion		Model 14: Depletion	
	γ	*SE*	γ	*SE*	γ	*SE*	γ	*SE*
Intercept	1.79*	(.11)	1.82*	(.11)	1.78*	(.11)	1.79*	(.11)
Controls								
Sine	.03	(.03)	.04	(.03)	.02	(.03)	.02	(.03)
Cosine	−.01	(.03)	−.01	(.03)	−.02	(.03)	−.02	(.03)
Day	−.00	(.01)	−.01	(.01)	−.01	(.01)	−.01	(.01)
Level 1 predictors								
Previous day depletion (t4)	.10*	(.04)	.09*	(.04)	.11*	(.04)	.10*	(.04)
End-state PA (t3)	**−.24***	(.05)	**−.26***	(.05)	—	—	—	—
PA trajectory (t1–t3)	**.16***	(.07)	**.16***	(.07)	—	—	—	—
End-state NA (t3)	**.35***	(.06)	**.35***	(.07)	—	—	—	—
NA trajectory (t1–t3)	**−.18**	(.12)	**−.15**	(.13)	—	—	—	—
End-state valence (t3)	—	—	—	—	**−.44***	(.05)	**−.46***	(.05)
Valence Trajectory (t1–t3)	—	—	—	—	**.19***	(.08)	**.22***	(.08)
End-state activation (t3)	—	—	—	—	−.16*	(.05)	−.16*	(.05)
Activation trajectory (t1–t3)	—	—	—	—	.11	(.06)	.12	(.07)
Moderators (Level 1)								
Authentic emotional experiences (t4)	−.12*	(.04)	—	—	−.12*	(.04)	—	—
Antecedent-focused strategies (t4)	—	—	−.03	(.02)	—	—	−.02	(.03)
Response-focused strategies (t4)	—	—	.01	(.02)	—	—	.02	(.03)
Interactions								
PA trajectory × Authentic emotions	−.07	(.11)	—	—	—	—	—	—
NA trajectory × Authentic emotions	−.07	(.24)	—	—	—	—	—	—
PA trajectory × Antecedent-focused	—	—	.05	(.09)	—	—	—	—
NA trajectory × Antecedent-focused	—	—	.23	(.13)	—	—	—	—
PA trajectory × Response-focused	—	—	−.11	(.10)	—	—	—	—
NA trajectory × Response-focused	—	—	−.40*	(.13)	—	—	—	—
Val. trajectory × Authentic emotions	—	—	—	—	−.06	(.13)	—	—
Act. trajectory × Authentic emotions	—	—	—	—	.09	(.11)	—	—
Val. trajectory × Antecedent-focused	—	—	—	—	—	—	−.10	(.08)
Act. trajectory × Antecedent-focused	—	—	—	—	—	—	−.02	(.07)
Val. trajectory × Response-focused	—	—	—	—	—	—	.07	(.10)
Act. trajectory × Response-focused	—	—	—	—	—	—	−.08	(.08)
R^2 (Day-level)	25%	—	23%	—	21%	—	19%	—

Note. Level 1 N = 1,300; Level 2 N = 162.
* $p < .05$

We found that use of response-focused emotion regulation (but not antecedent-focused) moderated the relationship between NA trajectory and daily depletion (γ = −.40, $p < .05$). Specifically, on days when employees used a greater number of response-focused emotion regulation tactics than usual, the relationship between NA trajectory and depletion was negative and significant (simple slope +1 *SD* = −.44, $p < .05$). This is particularly interesting, as it highlights a boundary condition and sheds light on the null findings for our hypothesized direct effect of NA trajectories on depletion.[3] Daily antecedent- and response-focused regulation did not moderate the relationships between PA trajectory or valence/activation trajectory and depletion. Thus, consistent with past work, our exploratory analyses suggest that the extent to which emotion regulation "harms" (i.e., depletes) employees is exacerbated by the strategy used to do so. Interestingly, for emotional journeys, this effect surfaced specifically when the focus lay in reducing high activation, negative emotions.

Finally, to test the importance of both distance and direction underlying the emotional journey construct, we tested the possibility that it may be regulation underlying simple change—as opposed to change toward hedonic goals—that drives subsequent depletion. In other words, it could be simply distance (and not direction) that determines depletion. To rule out this possibility, we first reran our models using the absolute value of trajectories in place of directional trajectories. This isolates the magnitude of change while removing the direction of change. The absolute values of PA/NA trajectories and valence/activation trajectories did *not* predict depletion. Thus, in an affect shift sense, it seems that depletion does not stem from "shifting" in general (i.e., underlying directionless emotional journeys); rather, it is the act of upshifting in PA (and the underlying emotional journey of a positive PA trajectory—increasing positive, activated emotions) that is responsible for heightened depletion. Likewise, it is specifically moving away from more negative toward more positive emotions (i.e., a positive valence trajectory) that increases depletion. As an alternate test, we also followed existing

[3] This result also lends indirect support to Scott, Awasty, et al.'s (2020, p. 434) assertion that, "when surface acting is used, moving to a less activated display will be more harmful to the actor compared to moving to a more activated display. The same logic also applies to situations where surface acting is used to lower the intensity of the same emotion (e.g., from intense to mild enthusiasm)." According to Scott, Awasty, et al., this occurs because concealing more intense emotions (while feigning emotions of milder intensity, in the case of surface acting) consumes attentional resources and is more taxing as a result.

Figure 2

Study 1 Results of Multilevel Path Analysis for Within-Emotion Intensity Changes (Positive Affect/Negative Affect [PA/NA] End-States and PA/NA Trajectories)



Note. Level 1 $N = 1{,}300$; Level 2 $N = 162$. For PA trajectories, higher positive values indicate increasing intensity of high activation, positive emotions, while more negative values indicate decreasing intensity of high activation, positive emotions. For NA trajectories, more negative values indicate decreasing intensity of high activation, negative emotions, while higher positive values indicate increasing intensity of high activation, negative emotions. For both PA and NA trajectories, a value of zero indicates steady (or unchanging) PA/NA over the three measurements.
* $p < .05$.

work on variability (e.g., Matta et al., 2017) and controlled for the standard deviation of daily PA/NA as well as valence/activation across the three time points in our main models. All of our hypothesized relationships held when controlling for PA/NA variability (as well as valence/activation variability). Thus, the hedonic emotional journey effect (i.e., directional slope) holds even after accounting for (nondirectional) change itself.

Study 2 Introduction

Study 1 offered numerous strengths—five measurements each day, a wide range of occupations, time separation between all measurements, two operationalizations of emotional journeys, and a host of theoretically relevant moderators and behavioral outcomes. Even still, field studies cannot provide the best case for internal validity, nor can they control for outside "noise" to rule out alternative explanations. To this end, we conducted a lab study. We designed a lab to isolate the effects of changing valence and cleanly demonstrate that the effects of emotional end-states are meaningfully altered by the journey that produced them.

Study 2 Method

Sample and Procedures

We collected data from undergraduate students enrolled in management classes at a large United States university. Participants needed to be 18 years or older, and they were given course credit in exchange for their participation. This data collection was approved by University of Georgia's IRB (PROJECT00001143: Memory of Past Experiences). Because our predictions concern the unique effects of directional changes in valence, we designed our lab to manipulate valence while holding activation constant (at a neutral level). In other words, we manipulated movement along the "equator" in Figure 1 (the bidirectional dotted arrow from negative, neutral activation emotions to positive, neutral activation emotions). We used a 2 (negative valence vs. positive valence induction at Time 1) × 2 (negative valence vs. positive valence induction at Time 2) design. Students signed up for the lab and were randomly assigned to one of the four conditions. We collected data from 260 participants—65 people for each condition (in line with a medium effect size with power of ˜.80). The sample was 57% female, average age was 20.4 years ($SD = 1.2$), and demographic information was as follows: 12% Asian or Pacific Islander, 5% Black or African American, 5% Hispanic or Latino, 76% White or Caucasian, and 2% other.

We used the paradigm outlined by Bledow et al.'s (2013) lab study of affect shift as a starting point for our lab. That is, participants were instructed that they would be completing two "autobiographical memory tasks"—emotionally laden writing tasks that were used to induce positive (negative) emotions at two time points. We based our manipulations (see Table 6) on

Figure 3

Study 1 Results of Multilevel Path Analysis for Between-Emotion Valence/Activation Changes



Note. Level 1 $N = 1{,}300$; Level 2 $N = 162$. For valence trajectories, higher positive values indicate movement from more negative toward more positive emotions, while more negative values indicate movement from more positive toward more negative emotions. For activation trajectories, higher positive values indicate movement from less to more activated emotion states, while more negative values indicate movement from more to less activated emotion states. For both valence and activation trajectories, a value of zero indicates steady (or unchanging) valance/activation over the three measurements.
* $p < .05$.

validated methods of affect induction (e.g., Bledow et al., 2013; Dunn & Schweitzer, 2005), and we used Larsen and Diener's (1992) positive and negative neutral activation emotions to craft our manipulations (see also Bartel & Saavedra, 2000). The same manipulations were used for the first and second affect inductions. Regardless of condition, participants were instructed to list and describe different things and memories each time. After completing the two randomly assigned affect induction tasks, participants rated their depletion.

Measures

Participants rated depletion using the same measure from Study 1 ($\alpha = .93$) and reported positive, neutral activation emotions (Time 1, 2 $\alpha = .97, .97$) and negative, neutral activation emotions (Time 1, 2 $\alpha = .93, .93$) using the six emotion words for each listed in Figure 1.

Study 2 Results

Manipulation Checks

To test our manipulations, we first utilized a four (conditions: negative–positive, positive–positive, positive–negative, and negative–negative) by two (Time 1 positive emotions and Time 2 positive emotions) mixed ANOVA, specifying affect measurements as the within-subject factor. We then repeated this procedure using Time 1 negative emotions and Time 2 negative emotions as the within subject factor. Condition ($F[3, 256] = 15.34$, $p < .05$; $F[3, 256] = 10.08$, $p < .05$) and the interaction of time and condition ($F[3, 256] = 45.67$, $p < .05$; $F[3, 256] = 32.52$, $p < .05$) were significant for both positive and negative emotions as the within-subject factors.

We also utilized ANOVA to compare participants in conditions that began with a positive induction against participants in conditions that began with a negative induction. Those with the positive induction at Time 1 rated their positive emotions at Time 1 significantly higher than those who received the negative induction ($M_{\text{Pos}} = 3.62$ vs. $M_{\text{Neg}} = 2.62$; $F = 55.47$, $p < .05$). Similarly, those with the negative induction at Time 1 rated their negative emotions at Time 1 significantly higher than those who received the positive induction ($M_{\text{Neg}} = 2.17$ vs. $M_{\text{Pos}} = 1.48$; $F = 40.66$, $p < .05$). Our results suggest that the affect manipulations worked as intended.

Hypothesis Testing

We tested our Hypotheses using planned contrast tests (Rosenthal & Rosnow, 1985; for similar, see Fast et al., 2014; Hüffmeier et al., 2017). The mean levels of depletion for each condition are shown in Table 7. Comparison of all participants with a more positive end-state (positive–positive and negative–positive conditions) against all

Table 6
Study 2 Passages for Positive and Negative Neutral Activation Affect Inductions

Inductions
High positive valence, neutral activation induction
Warm-up task
First, we'd like you to list and briefly describe 3–5 things that make you feel ***most happy, delighted, glad, cheerful, pleased, and/or warmhearted.***
Memory Recall Task
Now, please describe in detail the one situation that has made you the ***most happy, delighted, glad, cheerful, pleased, and/or warmhearted*** you have been in your life, and describe it such that a person reading the description would become ***happy, delighted, glad, cheerful, pleased, and/or warmhearted*** just from hearing about the situation.
High negative valence, neutral activation induction
Warm-up task
First, we'd like you to list and briefly describe 3–5 things that make you feel ***most unhappy, miserable, grouchy, sad, gloomy, and/or blue.***
Memory recall task
Now, please describe in detail the one situation that has made you the ***most unhappy, miserable, grouchy, sad, gloomy, and/or blue*** you have been in your life, and describe it such that a person reading the description would become ***unhappy, miserable, grouchy, sad, gloomy, and/or blue*** just from hearing about the situation.

participants with a more negative end-state (negative–negative and positive–negative conditions) allowed us to test Corollary 1—that, all else equal, more positive end-states yield lower depletion. In support of this, mean depletion for participants ending with more positive emotions was significantly lower than mean depletion for participants ending with more negative emotions ($M_{\text{EndPos}} = 2.38$ vs. $M_{\text{EndNeg}} = 2.88$; difference = .50; contrast value = 1.00, $p < .05$; Cohen's $d = .45$).

The corollary of Hypothesis 2 predicted that, end-states equal, transitioning away from negative toward positive emotions would increase depletion. To test this, we compared participants in the negative–positive condition to participants in the positive–positive condition. This test allowed us to hold the end-state positive valence constant and isolate the effect of moving away from negative and toward positive emotions. Supporting our prediction, mean depletion for participants experiencing the emotional journey toward hedonic goals was significantly higher than mean depletion for participants in the constant positive condition ($M_{\text{Neg-Pos}} = 2.65$ vs. $M_{\text{Pos-Pos}} = 2.12$; difference = .53; $p < .05$; Cohen's $d = .52$).

Supplementary Analyses

Though not hypothesized, an exploratory comparison revealed that mean depletion for those in the negative–positive condition was negligibly different from mean depletion in both of the conditions ending with more negative emotions ($M_{\text{NegPos}} = 2.65$ vs. $M_{\text{PosNeg}} = 2.81$ vs. $M_{\text{NegNeg}} = 2.96$; differences = .16, .31, *ns*). Put differently, when it comes to depletion, undergoing an emotional journey toward hedonic goals may effectively "cancel out" the supposed benefits of a positive end-state, making those in this condition no different from their more negative counterparts. Although the end-state is not held constant in these comparisons, it flows from our theorizing that one group (the negative–positive group) is benefited by a more positive end-state but disadvantaged by an emotional journey directed toward hedonic goals. Meanwhile, the other two groups are disadvantaged by more negative end-states but benefited by having endured no hedonic-directed emotional journey to arrive there. Together, the results of our lab reaffirm the central pieces of our model—(a) the notion that emotional journeys leading up to emotional end-states meaningfully "change" the essence of the end-state and (b) emotional journeys are depleting when moving away from negative emotions toward positive emotions (i.e., in pursuit of hedonic goals).

Discussion

Implications for Theory and Practice

Our work contributes to theory in a number of ways. First, we extend recent advances from emotion regulation research and apply them to emotion experiences more broadly. By expanding the emotional journey concept inspired by Scott, Awasty, et al. (2020), we build theory that reconciles key inconsistencies between research on emotions—which touts the benefits of pursuing high PA—and research on emotion regulation—which warns the costs of redirecting emotions. Our integrated framework bridges these perspectives and their competing effects on outcomes. Given that the only literature to introduce changes in affect has similarly emphasized the benefits of increasing PA (whether accompanied by a decrease or increase in NA; Bledow et al., 2011, 2013; Yang et al., 2016) and the emotion regulation literature has narrowly focused on required or intentional emotional displays (as opposed to all emotional experiences), our theory and results could not be extrapolated from existing work.

Second, in developing our theory, we propose a new way to construe any emotional experience—by taking into account not only a momentary end-state but also the journeys that led up to it in terms of both the distance and direction traveled. Critically, by highlighting that equal emotion end-states are not always *created* equal—and it depends on their preceding journeys—our work fundamentally changes scholarly understanding of emotional states. That is, although both the affect literature (broadly) and affect shift literature (specifically) conclude that higher positive emotions are an end that one should pursue, we demonstrate that this pursuit may come with heretofore unconsidered

Table 7
Study 2 Mean Values by Condition

	Conditions	Depletion mean values by condition
Positive, neutral activation end-state	***Journey Toward Hedonic Goals:*** **Negative induction (*T1*) × Positive induction (*T2*)**	2.65 (1.02)
	Flat Journey (positive): Positive induction *(T1)* × Positive induction *(T2)*	2.12 (1.04)
Negative, neutral activation end-state	*Journey Away from Hedonic Goals:* Positive induction (*T1*) × Negative induction *(T2)*	2.81 (1.18)
	Flat Journey (negative): Negative induction *(T1)* × Negative induction *(T2)*	2.96 (1.12)

Note. $N = 260$. Standard deviations are in parentheses.

costs that change the meaning of that end. We provide the first study to reveal and quantify the extent of these costs.

Third, we build and test theory that directly addresses the affect literature's limitation of focusing on/measuring strictly high activation positive and negative emotions while often theorizing about positive and negative emotions (or activation) more generally. To advance the literature, we theoretically tackle and operationalize emotional journeys two ways—within-emotion changes in intensity (i.e., PA/NA trajectories) and between-emotion changes in valence and activation (i.e., valence/activation trajectories). Our approach serves as both a steppingstone and a blueprint for future research interested in taking a more nuanced approach to understanding changes in emotions and disentangling valence versus activation-driven effects.

Finally, our work extends self-regulation and emotion regulation theories. First, our operationalizations for the emotional journey construct directly capture the amount of emotion regulation that leads up to a given end-state—a construct that, ironically, has been theoretically and empirically missing from emotion regulation work (Scott, Awasty, et al., 2020). Second, in building and testing our theorizing, we meaningfully advance work on understudied automatic emotion regulation. We argue and indirectly support that automatic emotion regulation may not be significantly less costly than more conscious regulation when it comes to pursuing hedonic goals—a topic for which conclusive evidence is essentially nonexistent (Baumeister & Vohs, 2016; Fitzsimons & Bargh, 2004). Third, despite the assumption that PA is beneficial from a regulatory resource perspective, recent reviews suggest the PA-depletion relationship may not be as straightforward as previously thought (Johnson et al., 2017). By separating end-states from trajectories, we begin unpacking the nuanced relationship between positive emotions and regulatory resources. Finally, we build a rich initial nomological network for emotional journeys within a self-regulation framework—identifying controlled regulation strategies (i.e., response-focused regulation) and individual differences (i.e., neuroticism) that strengthen or buffer depleting effects of certain journeys on depletion, and linking emotional journeys to key workplace behaviors (i.e., CWBI, OCB, and task performance) via their effects on daily depletion.

These findings directly inform our implications for practice. Our work showcases the potential dark side of pursuing positive emotions (or avoiding negative ones) and cautions leaders and employees alike that although positive end states are "good" from both a hedonic and performance perspective, when the path to get there is too effortful, we may not derive the full benefit of these end states. Moreover, because "the means" of improving emotions require resource costs that are only offset by "the end," managers may wish to consider whether employees have sufficient resources to embark on emotional journeys in the first place. For example, because employees are likely to have fewer self-regulatory resources available as the day goes on, attempts to significantly improve employee emotions might benefit from earlier (rather than later) start-times. In this way, managers can help to ensure that employees have enough "gas in the tank" to reach advantageous end-states.

We also contextualize these relationships for managers, identifying employees who are more likely to be drained by enduring certain emotional journeys and identifying strategies that may prove particularly burdensome. Though not hypothesized, we found that increasing emotion activation level is draining. Thus, for jobs that require high activation emotions (regardless of valence), managers might consider *which* employees are best suited to handle the emotional regulation that may be needed to "get there" and seek out employees lower in neuroticism. Perhaps even more critical, though, we demonstrate that these same employees may *not* actually be any better at enduring emotional journeys toward hedonic goals (i.e., increasing PA or improving valence). Finally, we provide managers and employees with the insight that when it comes to negative NA trajectories specifically (i.e., decreasing intensity of negative, activated emotions such as anxiety or distress), response-focused strategies prove especially burdensome.

Limitations and Future Directions

Taken together, our studies have several strengths. For example, Study 1 featured field data from employees in a diverse set of occupations, utilized five daily measurements, captured emotions from all octants of the circumplex, and enforced time separation of all variables (including the emotional trajectories). Moreover, in Study 1, we explored effects of within-person emotion regulation techniques, between-person differences, and behavioral outcomes with real-world relevance. Study 2 then featured lab data that allowed us to hold constant the impetus for emotional journeys, ruled out alternative explanations, and provided strong evidence for internal validity in the relationships between emotional journeys toward hedonic goals and resource depletion.

One limitation of our work, however, is the bounding assumption that employees are generally regulating toward hedonic goals (i.e., toward more positive emotions and away from more negative emotions). Though our assumption is theory-driven from hedonic perspectives on emotion (Larsen, 2000) and scholars have noted that expectations for negative emotions are more the exception than the norm (Scott, Awasty, et al., 2020), we note that our model may not hold in instances where employees make it their goal to truly feel bad. Given that certain jobs or circumstances may "override" the default goal to feel good (e.g., Lennard et al., 2019; Scott, Awasty, et al., 2020; Scott, Lennard, et al., 2020), future research would be well served to unpack how these specific professions, individuals, or circumstances might affect the directional component in emotional journeys.

Another limitation is that our findings here were constrained to 10 days. As such, there is still great potential to learn about between-person differences in the "average" journeys employees take and the effects of doing so in the long run. For example, not changing on a given day may preserve resources and spare performance that day, but failing to change emotions (and failing to meet hedonic goals) over a longer duration may be accompanied by its own set of problems. To unpack longer-term phenomena will likely require daily studies over extended periods of time, but this is an advancement we would be excited to see. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, we hope that future work will begin to address how we might "tip the scales" to maximize benefits of positive emotions while minimizing costs of the journey.

Conclusion

We do not deny that end-states which "achieve" hedonic goals are advantageous—this general consensus formed extends to our work on resource depletion as well. However, our work also suggests that there is more to the story. Building from nascent research on affect shifts and incorporating new insights from the seemingly incompatible emotion regulation literature, we demonstrate that steeper daily PA trajectories and valence trajectories lead to depletion, ultimately triggering CWBI while harming OCB and performance. In other words, we show that the pursuit of positive emotion(s) as an end-state may come with unforeseen costs that change the meaning of that end-state. To truly judge any emotional state as worthy of "the chase," then, we must also consider the extent of regulation needed to catch it.

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Appendix

Items Used in Studies 1 and 2

Positive Affect (PA)

Study 1 Daily Assessments

Instructions: Please rate the extent to which the words below describe *how you feel right now*. Right now I feel …

1. Enthusiastic
2. Excited
3. Alert
4. Inspired
5. Determined

(Anchors: 1 = *very slightly or not at all*, 2 = *a little*, 3 = *moderately*, 4 = *quite a bit*, 5 = *very much*).

Negative Affect (NA)

Study 1 Daily Assessments

Instructions: Please rate the extent to which the words below describe *how you feel right now*. Right now I feel …

1. Distressed
2. Nervous
3. Afraid
4. Scared.
5. Upset

(Anchors: 1 = *very slightly or not at all*, 2 = *a little*, 3 = *moderately*, 4 = *quite a bit*, 5 = *very much*).

(*Appendix continues*)

Positive Valence, Neutral Activation Emotions

Study 1 Daily Assessments; Study 2 Manipulation Check

Study 1 Instructions: Please rate the extent to which the words below describe *how you feel right now*. Right now I feel ...

Study 2 Instructions: Listed below is a series of words that describe different feelings and emotions. Please indicate to what extent you feel this way *right now, in this moment*.

1. Happy
2. Delighted
3. Glad
4. Cheerful
5. Pleased
6. Warmhearted

(Anchors: 1 = *very slightly or not at all*, 2 = *a little*, 3 = *moderately*, 4 = *quite a bit*, 5 = *very much*).

Negative Valence, Neutral Activation Emotions

Study 1 Daily Assessments; Study 2 Manipulation Check

Study 1 Instructions: Please rate the extent to which the words below describe *how you feel right now*. Right now I feel ...

Study 2 Instructions: Listed below is a series of words that describe different feelings and emotions. Please indicate to what extent you feel this way *right now, in this moment*.

1. Unhappy
2. Miserable
3. Grouchy
4. Sad
5. Gloomy
6. Blue

(Anchors: 1 = *very slightly or not at all*, 2 = *a little*, 3 = *moderately*, 4 = *quite a bit*, 5 = *very much*).

Positive Valence, High Activation Emotions

Study 1 Daily Assessments

Instructions: Please rate the extent to which the words below describe *how you feel right now*. Right now I feel ...

1. Euphoric
2. Lively
3. Enthusiastic
4. Excited
5. Peppy
6. Elated

(Anchors: 1 = *very slightly or not at all*, 2 = *a little*, 3 = *moderately*, 4 = *quite a bit*, 5 = *very much*).

Negative Valence, High Activation Emotions

Study 1 Daily Assessments

Instructions: Please rate the extent to which the words below describe *how you feel right now*. Right now I feel ...

1. Distressed
2. Anxious
3. Annoyed
4. Fearful
5. Nervous
6. Jittery.

(Anchors: 1 = *very slightly or not at all*, 2 = *a little*, 3 = *moderately*, 4 = *quite a bit*, 5 = *very much*).

Positive Valence, Low Activation Emotions

Study 1 Daily Assessments

Instructions: Please rate the extent to which the words below describe *how you feel right now*. Right now I feel ...

1. Calm
2. Relaxed
3. At Rest
4. Serene
5. Content
6. At Ease.

(Anchors: 1 = *very slightly or not at all*, 2 = *a little*, 3 = *moderately*, 4 = *quite a bit*, 5 = *very much*).

Negative Valence, Low Activation Emotions

Study 1 Daily Assessments

Instructions: Please rate the extent to which the words below describe *how you feel right now*. Right now I feel ...

1. Tired
2. Dull
3. Drowsy
4. Sluggish
5. Bored
6. Droopy

(*Appendix continues*)

(Anchors: 1 = *very slightly or not at all*, 2 = *a little*, 3 = *moderately*, 4 = *quite a bit*, 5 = *very much*).

Neutral Valence, High Activation Emotions

Study 1 Daily Assessments

Instructions: Please rate the extent to which the words below describe *how you feel right now*. Right now I feel ...

1. Aroused
2. Astonished
3. Stimulated
4. Surprised
5. Active
6. Intense.

(Anchors: 1 = *very slightly or not at all*, 2 = *a little*, 3 = *moderately*, 4 = *quite a bit*, 5 = *very much*).

Neutral Valence, Low Activation Emotions

Study 1 Daily Assessments

Instructions: Please rate the extent to which the words below describe *how you feel right now*. Right now I feel ...

1. Quiet
2. Tranquil
3. Still
4. Inactive
5. Idle
6. Passive

(Anchors: 1 = *very slightly or not at all*, 2 = *a little*, 3 = *moderately*, 4 = *quite a bit*, 5 = *very much*).

Depletion

Study 1 Daily Assessment; Study 2 Single Assessment

Study 1 Instructions: Please rate the extent to which you agree or disagree with the statements below *based on how you feel right now*. Right now ...

Study 2 Instructions: Listed below is a series of statements. Please indicate to what extent the statements describe how you feel *right now, in this moment*.

1. I feel drained.
2. I feel like my willpower is gone.
3. My mind feels unfocused.
4. It would take a lot of effort for me to concentrate on something.
5. My mental energy is running low.

(Anchors: 1 = *strongly disagree*, 2 = *disagree*, 3 = *neutral*, 4 = *agree*, 5 = *strongly agree*).

CWBI

Study 1 Daily Assessment

Instructions: Please rate the extent to which you agree or disagree with the statements below *based on how you have behaved over the past several hours*. Over the past several hours I have ...

1. behaved in an unpleasant manner toward my coworkers.
2. tried to harm my coworkers.
3. criticized coworkers' opinions or suggestions.
4. excluded coworkers from conversations.
5. tried to avoid interacting with coworkers.
6. spoken poorly about my coworkers to others.

(Anchors: 1 = *strongly disagree*, 2 = *disagree*, 3 = *neutral*, 4 = *agree*, 5 = *strongly agree*).

OCB

Study 1 Daily Assessment

Instructions: Please rate the extent to which you agree or disagree with the statements below *based on how you have behaved over the past several hours*. Over the past several hours I have ...

1. gone out of my way to be a good employee.
2. been respectful of other people's needs.
3. displayed loyalty to my organization.
4. praised or encouraged someone.
5. volunteered to do something that was not required.
6. shown genuine concern for others.
7. tried to uphold the values of my organization.
8. tried to be considerate of others.

(Anchors: 1 = *strongly disagree*, 2 = *disagree*, 3 = *neutral*, 4 = *agree*, 5 = *strongly agree*).

Task Role Performance

Study 1 Daily Assessment

Instructions: Please rate the extent to which you agree or disagree with the statements below *based on how you have behaved over the past several hours*. Over the past several hours I have ...

1. carried out the core parts of my job well. *(task proficiency).*

(*Appendix continues*)

2. completed my core tasks well using the standard procedures. *(task proficiency).*
3. ensured my tasks were completed properly. *(task proficiency).*
4. adapted well to changes in core tasks. *(task adaptivity).*
5. coped with changes to the way I have to do my core tasks. *(task adaptivity).*
6. learned new skills to help me adapt to changes in my core tasks. *(task adaptivity).*
7. initiated better ways of doing my core tasks. *(task proactivity).*
8. come up with ideas to improve the way in which my core tasks are done. *(task proactivity).*
9. made changes to the way my core tasks are done. *(task proactivity).*

(Anchors: 1 = *strongly disagree*, 2 = *disagree*, 3 = *neutral*, 4 = agree, 5 = *strongly agree*).

Neuroticism

Study 1 Trait Assessment

Instructions: Please indicate the extent to which you agree the following words describe you. Please be as accurate as possible, describing how you see yourself at the present time, not as you wish to be in the future.

1. Unenvious (reverse-scored)
2. Relaxed (reverse-scored)
3. Moody
4. Fretful
5. Temperamental
6. Touchy
7. Envious
8. Jealous

(Anchors: 1 = *strongly disagree*, 2 = *disagree*, 3 = *neutral*, 4 = *agree*, 5 = *strongly agree*).

Authentic Emotions (Supplemental Analysis)

Study 1 Daily Assessment

Instructions: Please rate the extent to which the following statements are true of *yourself/your work today*. Today . . .

1. The emotions I expressed at work were genuine.
2. The emotions I showed at work came naturally.
3. The emotions I showed at work matched what I spontaneously felt.

(Anchors: 1 = *to a very small extent*, 2 = *to a small extent*, 3 = *somewhat*, 4 = *to a large extent*, 5 = *to a very large extent*).

Antecedent-Focused Emotion Regulation (Supplemental Analysis)

Study 1 Daily Assessment

Instructions: From the statements below, please indicate *all* of the of the activities that are representative of you today.

1. I *spent time in situations* that helped me feel emotions I wanted to have and that prevented emotions I did not want to have.
2. I *changed situations* so that they helped me feel emotions I wanted and did not lead to emotions I did not want.
3. I *paid attention to/concentrated on things* that helped me feel emotions I wanted and prevented me from feeling emotions I did not want.
4. I *changed my perspective/the way I thought about things* to help me feel emotions I wanted and prevent me from feeling emotions I did not want.

(Anchors: 0 = *no*, 1 = *yes*).

Response-Focused Emotion Regulation (Supplemental Analysis)

Study 1 Daily Assessment

Instructions: From the statements below, please indicate *all* of the of the activities that are representative of you today.

1. I *focused/concentrated* on the emotions I wanted to last and not on the emotions I did not want.
2. I *behaved in ways that intensified* the emotions I wanted to last and not the emotions I did not want.
3. I *focused on body signals/internal signs* of the emotions I wanted to last and not on the emotions I did not want.

(Anchors: 0 = *no*, 1 = *yes*).

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