Table 2: When does it pay to settle out of court?
This example is simplified, because it is binary and represents a continuum.

		DEFENDANT
		OPTIMISTIC	PESSIMISTIC
PLAINTIFF	OPTIMISTIC	Trial	Tendency to Settle
	PESSIMISTIC	Tendency to Settle	Settle

Table 3: Tragedy of the Commons

# Herdsmen	Cost per cow	Gallons of milk/cow	Net Return (To Herdsman)	Net Return (To Society)
1	$1	10	9
2	$1	9	8
3	$1	8	7
4	$1	7	6
5	$1	6	5
6	$1	5	4
7	$1	4	3
8	$1	3	2
9	$1	2	1
10	$1	1	0
1`	$1	0.5	-.5

Table 4: Prisoner's Dilemma and conservation of resources

Table 5: Public Goods

		RIVAL?
		YES	NO
EXCLUDABLE?	YES	Private Goods    Ice cream cones    Clothing    Congested toll roads	Natural Monopolies    Fire protection    Cable TV    Unongested toll roads
	NO	Common Resources    Fish in the Ocean    The environment    Congested non-toll roads	Public Goods    National defense    Unprotected Knowledge    Uncongested non-toll roads

Table 6: Coase Theorem Example

	Cost to Farmer	Cost to RR	Property Rights	Transaction Costs	Outcome
Example 1	$100	$200	RR	$0
Example 2	$100	$200	Farmer	$0
Example 3	$100	$200	RR	$150
Example 4	$100	$200	Farmer	$150
Example 5	$200	$100	RR	$0
Example 6	$200	$100	Farmer	$0
Example 7	$200	$100	RR	$150
Example 8	$200	$100	Farmer	$150

Table 7: Market Structures and Corresponding Characteristics:

Market Structure	# of firms	Size	Products	Price Control	Barriers to Entry	Examples
Perfect Competition	Many	Very Small	Same	None	Very low	Dairy Farmer
Monopolistic Competition	Many	Small	Similar try to differentiate	Little	None	Restaurant, Music groups
Oligopoly	Small #	Large	Range	Some	Range	Cars, Cola,  Cigarettes
Monopoly	One	Very Big	Unique	Choose p and quant.	High	Post office, utility, patent

Table 8: From Ford Motor Company Internal Memorandum: 
"Fatalities Associated with Crash-Induced Fuel Leakage and Fires"

Table 9: Examining Different Liability Rules for Torts

	Injurer faultless	-Injurer at fault -Victim at fault	-Injurer at fault (below level of precaution) -Victim faultless
Negligence	Injurer not liable	Injurer liable	Injurer liable
Contributory Negligence	Injurer not liable	Injurer not liable	Injurer liable
Comparative Negligence	Injurer not liable	Injurer liable in proportion to its negligence	Injurer liable

Table 10a: Agency game without a contract

		SECOND PLAYER
		COOPERATE	APPROPRIATE
FIRST PLAYER	INVEST	(.5,.5)	(-1,1)
	DON'T INVEST	(0,0)	(0,0)

Note: the first number in the parentheses is the payoff for the first player.
 

Table 10b: Agency game with a contract

		SECOND PLAYER
		COOPERATE	APPROPRIATE
FIRST PLAYER	INVEST	(.5,.5)	(.5,-.5)
	DON'T INVEST	(0,0)	(0,0)

Note: the first number in the parentheses is the payoff for the first player.
 

Table 11a: Will unexpected costs necessarily terminate an unenforceable agreement?

	A	B
If A Fulfills Agreement with B	$100,000	$100,000
Now costs to A increase by $150,000	-$50,000	$100,000
If A Backs out	$0	$0
Solution

Table 11b: Will an enforceable contract necessarily be fulfilled?

	A	B
If A Fulfills Contract to B	$100,000	$100,000
Now costs to A increase by $250,000	-$150,000	$100,000
Solution

Table 12: 1999 Crime Rates

	National Rate	Athens Rate	Atlanta Rate
Index	4,266.8	6,302.4	5,734.9
Violent	524.7	413.2	617.2
Murder	5.7	5.0	8.4
Rape	32.7	43.9	32.3
Robbery	150.2	140.8	232.9
Aggravated Assault	336.1	223.6	343.6
Property Crime	3,742.1	5,889.2	5,117.7
Burglary	770.0	1,079.8	994.9
Larceny	2,551.4	4,408.2	3,412.3
Auto Theft	420.7	401.2	710.

Source: FBI Uniform Crime Reports - http://www.fbi.gov/ucr/99cius.htm
 
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Table x: Combined national and local rates of tax on corporate income
 

Country	2000	2005	Percent Change 2000-2005
Ireland	24.0	12.5	-47.9
Hungary	18.0	16.0	-11.1
Poland	28.0	19.0	-32.1
Slovakia	29.0	19.0	-34.5
UK	30.0	30.0	0.0
Netherlands	35.0	31.5	-10.0
Belgium	40.2	34.0	-15.4
France	37.8	34.3	-9.3
Italy	41.2	37.2	-9.7
Germany	52.0	38.3 / 32.0	-26.3 / -38.5
US	39.4	39.4	0.0
Japan	40.9	40.9	0.0

Source: KPMG, OECD, Wall St. Journal, Tuesday March 22, 2005, p. A14.

Table x: Returns to Scale - relationship between inputs and outputs:
 

Market Structure	Costs	Size	Outputs
Increasing	As Q goes up, Cost drops	Very Large	Outputs increase at greater rate than inputs
Decreasing	As Q goes up, Cost increases	Very Small	Outputs increase at slower rate than inputs
Constant	As Q goes up, Cost stays the same	Any size	Outputs increase at same rate as inputs

Table y: Market Structures and Corresponding Characteristics: